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Nigeria's first refinery was conunissioned in October 19,65. 
A second refinery is under construction and is scheduled 
to come on stream in late 1977. This paper compares and 
contrasts the two projects in terms of how the process of 
transferring refinery technology has changed over the 
last decade. An attempt is also made to account for and 
assess the changes which occur. 1 , 
When discussing the transfe~ of technology it is 
useful to distinguish between the transmission of scienti-
fic and technical knowledge in general and the transfer 
of technology ,needed directly for economicgrowth. 2 The 
general knowledge is created by research and is not di-
rectly the object of conunercial transactions. In contrast, 
the technology that is closely linked ,with productive ac-
tivities is transmitted for' a price. The elements of 
knowledge needed for investment and production have become 
increaSingly science-based and hence are created mostly in 
developed countries according to the existing division of 
labour in science and technology. These elements'are com-
mercial'ized through what has been called the transfer of 
technology. It is these aspects of conunercialized tech-
nical knowledge that are of most interest in the follOWing 
discussion of the two refinery projects in Nigeria. They 
include3 
1. Those elements needed in the pre-investment and con-
str.uction phases of a project: ' 
(a) feasibility studies and market surveys prior to in-' 
vestment; 
(b) information on the range of technologies available; 
(c) engineering design and selection of machinery; 
(d) plant construction and installation of equipment; and 
(e) process technology. 
2. Those elements needed in the production phase: 
(a) knowledge concerning the management and operation of 
the production facilities! 
(b) marketing information and techniques; and 
(c) on-the-job improvement of the production process. 
Of these elements, design engineering and process 
technologies are the most science-based and therefore the 
most foreign to developing countries. T,he institutional 
modes or mechanisms for their transfer can be classified 
as follows: 
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1. Concessions or licence to use patented formulae, 
designs, models, procedures or specific pieces of tech-
nical knowledge; 
2. Contracts for the supply of equipment and correspond-
ing operating instructions; and 
3. Contracts for the supply of technical services asso-
ciated with the provision of any of the other elements of 
technical knowledge mentioned above. 
Contracts and licences are combined in different ways, 
ranging from the most packaged, arrangements to the most 
unpackaged ones, depending on how many groups or individ~ 
ua'i's a're' separately contracting with the, technology recip-
,ient. In the most packaged case the recipient contracts 
with only one contractor to supply the whole technological 
ensemble needed for what is then a turnkey project. ,At 
the other extreme the recipient contracts with one supplier 
for each element of technical knowledge and might even be 
supplying some itself. . 
The degree of packaging usually reflects the degree 
of external ownership. Technology is highly packaged in 
the case of· a subsidiary which is wholly-owned by a parent 
company', but it is less packaged in the cases' in which the 
new project remains in national hands after the transfer . 
is completed. But ownership and control over the process 
of acquiring technology are not always positively corre-
lated. For instance, fully national enterprises commonly: 
maintain links with foreign suppliers of ,technology through 
technical or mariagerial assistance agreements. 
The institutional options connected with packaging and 
ownership are central to three issues deriving from pat-
terns of technology diffusion and underdevelopment: 
1. The cost of the transfer of technology; 
2. The degree to whiCh the technology is appropriate; and 
3. The degree to which local scientific and technological 
capabilities are encouraged to develop. 
The issues arise not only because of the international di-
vision of labour in science and technology but also because 
the technology market is imperfect and the buy~r is usually 
in a weak bargaining position vis~a-vis the seller.. The 
following conditions contribute to this situation: 
1. the supplier has thorough knowledge of the object of 
the transaction and the buyer does not; 
2. the'buyer does not have enough knowledge about alter-
native sources of technology and transfer cQnditions; 
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3. the supplier knows how to sell technology as that 
is his trade while the recipient does not know how to buy 
it since he usually purchases the technology for a single 
project~ 
4. the supplier is protected by industrial property legis-
lation and practices, whereas the buyer usually does ,not 
have any legal structure to guide him, let alone protect 
him~ 
5. as a rule the marginal cost of the technology is low 
and decreasing for the supplier, whereas it is high and 
risky for the buyer~ 
6. the supplier often has close and helpful connections 
with the financing agents~ 
7. the supplier is often assisted by his own government 
and by other 'poli~ical' externalities~ 
8. the supplier often has large marketing resources in 
the form of publicity, public relations, prestigious 
trademarks, etc., with which to impress the buyer~ 
9. the technology transaction is usually welcomed by local 
industrialization policies. 
The buyer who is in a weak bargaining position is 
compelled to accept expensive conditions in order to ac-
quire technology. However, the strong bargaining position 
of the supplier is reinforced in those situations in which 
the buyer in the underdeveloped country gains personal 
advantage, often in the form of kickbacks, from the trans-
fer. The problems of technology transfer, while orginating 
in the commercial structure and policies of technology 
owners in developed countries, are intensified by the be-
haviour of those groups in underdeveloped countries which, 
in search of individual advantage, obtain technology on 
less than optimum terms. In pursuing their personal and 
often pecuniary interests, members of this intermediary 
stratum tend to accept and enjoy transfer conditions which 
as a whole jeopardize the possibility of autonomous devel-
opment in their countries. 
To summarize, in the following case studies we are 
concerned mainly with the technical knowledge and equip-
ment needed directly for investment and production; the 
institutional mechanisms of transfer, including the degree 
of packaging and the structure of ownership~ the problems 
of appropriateness, cost and development of indigenous 
science and technology capabilities~-and finally, the 
relative bargaining positions of supplier and recipient, 
given imperfections in the international technology market 
and the fact that groups exist in underdeveloped countries 
which benefit from the current situation. 
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_CASK I: __ THE -PORT-HARCOURT REFINERY 
Pl>OJ;-",t initi.ation: Nigerian 'oi1 was discovered in cQm-
mericial quantities in 1957 and first exported in 195a 
by Shell-BP Petroleum Development Co~ Ltd, ajointly~ 
owned subsidiary of the major Anglo-Dutch oil corpora-
tions. 4 As early as 1954 Shell-BP secured the option to 
build a refinery under the terms of the' Oil prospecting 
Licences which the colonial regime in Nigeria granted 
the oil company. 5 In June 1958 a 30-year Oil Mining 
Lease was signed by the company and. colonial government 
giving Shell-BP the right to build a refinery when pro"-
duction reached the (very low) level of 10,OOO'barrels 
a day (bd). 
Both the oil company and the Nigerian Government 
which was to take office in'1960 favoured the establish-
ment of a refinery. The government welcomed a savings 
of some £13 million 'or $40 million annually in foreign 
exchange spent on product imports. 6 In the early 1960s 
refineries - like airlines - were among the most sought-
after industrialization proje'cts in underdeveloped coun-
tries. 
Major oil companies established a pattern in the 
early 1950s of building large refineries near major mar- . 
kl'lts '.. Products were then exported to small underdevelop-
ed country markets. But since World War II, and especi-
ally since the.early 1960s; there has been a spate of 
refinery construction In poor countries with small mar.., 
kets. In 1950 less than half the products consumed in 
oil-importing underdeveloped countries were refined loc-
ally. By 1965 the proportion had increased to five-
sixths. 7 The refinery building boom was partly due to· 
pressures exerted by recipient governments, but it also 
r.eflected the competition between major oil companies and 
smaller independent firms which had become established 
since the war in a context of crude oil ·surplus. 
There is some evidence that major oil companies had 
a refining strategy for Africa as a whole but that an 
aggressive drive by small oil companies such as Italy's 
ENI forced the majors to accelerate their implementation 
of the programme. Barry Herman, viewing the African re-
fining problem on a continent-wide level, notes that 
••. it. is easy to see how costs could be reduced and· 
mutuality of interest made more secure if the majors 
could agree to divide up among themselve~ the respon-
sibility for building and operating the refineries 
in the v~rious necessary locations. Indeed, one 
industry executive has admitted that, since in most 
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African countries only one refinery would be allowed 
by the governments, the majors achieved an under-
standing among themselves as to which of them it 
would be in each country: i.e. they agreed which one 
wQuld'lead' in refinery project proposals in dif-
ferent countries (Shell in Kenya, BP in Nigeria, 
Stanvac in Ghana, etc.). The • leader' was supposed . 
to win the right to build· a refinery. It '!Ilould then 
be. in a position to process the oil of the other 
majors in exchange for the same privilege at their 
refineries in. the other countries. 8 
Small independent oil compailies such as Phillips and 
Union Oil along with Italian and Soviet state firms pos-
sessed crude by the early 1960s. They sought markets 
for crude and products through offering low prices and 
favourable terms. In particular by offering host govern-
ments equity in new refiner~es, the newcomers made in-
roads irito the major international companies' share of 
the refining industry. The majors· 9 share of refinery 
capacity outside North America and the Soviet bloc drop-
ped from two-thirds in 1961 to about two-fifths in 1965. 10 
In response to this successful drive by small inde-
pendent and state-owned oil companies, the majors joined 
the refinery building boom. Motivations included a 
• ••• normal commerical desire to safeguard or enlarge 
their share of the rapidly expanding market for petroleum 
products,·ll and a need to pre-empt the expansion of other 
oil entities. In order to. maintain the position in 
Africa the majors dropped the economically optimum strat-
egy of supplying small markets from huge Caribbean and 
European refineries and replaced it with a policy of 
building local plants, but they did so no sooner than 
competition from minors made necessary. Shell-BP secured 
the option to build a Nigerian refinery in 1954: eleven 
years later it was operating. 
In S~ptember 1959 Shell-BP brought a survey party 
from the UK to select 'a refinery site. 12 In July 1960 
the Nigerian Government and BP-Shell, not yet a company, 
began negotiations on building a refinery. A month after 
Nigerian independence in October 1960, the government 
issued a White Paper which authorised BP and Shell to 
build a refinery. The two firms formed a joint operation 
called BP-Shell Petroleum Refining Co. Ltd, and under-
took a study which showed that a plant capable of pro-
cessing 1.5 million tons of crude oil a year (30,000 bd) 
would cost NE9.6 million or about $28.0 mil~ion. 
British Petroleum Trading Ltd, the London head 
office, controlled all aspects of the project. However, 
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in anticipation of government shareholding and to pre-
serve the legally separate identity of the Nigerian sub-
sidiary, BP-Shell, and BP Trading, the appearance was 
maintained that BP-Shell was controlling and managing 
the project. For instance, the distinction between BP 
London and BP-Shell was maintained formally through the 
use of BP'TrCiding letterhead for 'conveying advice and 
assistance from London', rather than memorandum paper 
which was restricted to 'conv~ying instructions'.13 
In January 1962, BP Trading signed a Construction 
Service Agreement.with its refining subsidiary in Nigeria 
and site preparation began at Alesa-Eleme near Port 
Harcourt in the Eastern Region. According to the Agree-
ment terms, London was to provide technical, administra-
tive and general .advice as well as services outside 
Nigeria. The responsibility for project coordination 
rested. with the Commercial Division of the Refineries 
Department in BP head office. A London-based Project 
Superintendent liased with the refinery General Manager 
in Nigeria, Mr. Sheldrake, who was seconded from BP . 
Trading. After this mechanism was set up, BP-Shell in-
vited' bids. for refinerY'construction and in 1962 sur-
veyed manpower availability in Nige~ia prior to recruit-
ing personnel. 
OuJne"l'ship: In 1962. the Nigerian Government was brought 
into the project as a 'sleeping partner' by securing a 
financial interest. The Refinery Agreement, signed on 
25 July 1962 by BP-Shell and Alhaji Yussef Maitma Sule, 
Federal Minister of the Ministry of Mines and Power, 
provided for a refinery with 1.6 million tons ~f crude 
capacity to be oWned 50% by the Government and 25% each 
by BP and Shell. Capital of 10.2 m. Nigerian pounds 
(about US$28.6m.) was raised as follows: . 
sha"l'e aapitaZ. 
G'overnment 2" m A shares 
BP 1 m B shares 
Shell 1 m B shares 
loan capital 100%" . 
Government 50% 
BP 2S% 
Shell 25% 
N£4 m 
2m 
1m 
1m 
6.2m 
3.1 m 
l.SSm 
1.S5m 
BP, the operator of the project, appOinted the Managing 
Director who was also Chairman of the Board. The 
,:', 
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government had no experience in the refining industry 
and relied completely on the foreign companies. The 
Refinery and Operating Agreements were accepted by a new 
government, not yet fully staffed by Nigerians. 14 How-
ever, some politicians and Nigerian technicians-in-train-
ing felt that concessions to the companies were overly-
extravagant. 15 In November 1963 six government repre-
sentatives joined the Board of Directors and the com-
pany's name was changed to the Nigerian Petroleum Refin-
ing Co. Ltd (NPRC). . 
With A and B shareholders each having 50% of equity 
the refining company lacked a majority voice. This pos-
ed no immediate oroblem because British Petroleum Trad-
ing as the operator made all decisions •. It supplied 
materials and personnel for all stages including design, 
fabrication, erection, commissioning and operation. The 
only concern of government was with location16 and in 
fact.BPsupplied a turnkey project. 
The teahnoZogy p·aakage: Within limits, economies of 
scale favour ·the building of large refineries but, in 
response to the refinery boom in developing countries 
during the 1950s and 1960s, oil companies designed small 
plants whigh '.~.by sacrificing technological sophisti-
cqtion ••• !could/ .sometimes operate reasonably economi-
cally •••• .-17BP designed a simple, small and low-cost 
refinery for Nigeria. The Port Harcourt plant was de-
signed at 109m tons crude capacit:g per year (38,000 bd) 
to turn out products as follows: 1 
produat 
motor s'pir it 
kerosene 
gas, diesel oils 
fuel oils 
tons per year 
315,0'60 
210,000 
593,000 
781,000 
1,899,000 
(37,980 bd) 
% of totaZ production 
ifL6" 
11.1 
31.2 
41.1 
100.0 
Two process units were used to produce this range of 
products: 
" crude distillati'on unit 38,000 bd (1965) 60,000 bd (1973) 
catalytic reformer 4,600 bd (1965) 6,000 bd (1973) 
By 1966 a liquefied petroleum gas unit with a capacity 
of 10,000 tons a year had been added and was operating. 
The capacity was increased from 28 to 60 tons a day in 
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1973. 
__ Was the -choice -of-technology appropriate?-- TWo- c-r-i;'" 
ticisms of the plant design can be made. First ,there-
finery was too small. Within 18 months of operation it 
was running at full capacity. Even with the dampening 
effect of the civil war, consumption soon outran the 
capacities of the original design. 'Since the small 
plant failed to meet local demand, the marketing subsid-
iaries were able to continue selling imported petroleum 
products in Nigeria. Gearing capacity to demand at the 
time the plant went on stream meant that it would begin 
operations at nearly full capacity. This is an effec-
tive way of minimizing operating costs and·realizing a 
faster return on investment. But the costs to the na;.. 
tional economy of built-in capacity shortages are, con-
siderable,in terms of supply interruptions and foreign 
exchange expenditures for imports. BP and Shell took a 
short-term commercial view of the oil product market al-
though they were in a position to conduct demand studies 
via their marketing subsidiaries in Nigeria. There was 
no consideration of the impact which crude oil produc-
tion and attendant state revenues would have on product 
consumption. Throughout the planning period the govern-
ment remained uninvolved in capacity and demand ques-
tions. 19 . 
The second problem with the refinery design has to' 
do with the large proportion of fuel oil it produces. 
The plant was originally geared to produce enough gaso~ 
line and fuel oil for the local market. In the mid-1960s 
thermal electricity plants were the main users of fuel 
oil. With the commissioning of the Kainji Dam in 1968, 
consumption of fuel oil was cut by 60%. The oil compan-
ies diverted the excess fuel oil to export markets where 
it was in high demand and in which the-companies could 
sell it at their own price. Nigerian gasoline consump-
tion soon outstripped production, partly because road 
transport gained in importance as the railroad system 
atrophied due to poor management. Marketers were able 
to import and sell regular .and premium gasoline. This 
imbalance in the production-consumption pattern suggests 
that the BPdesign did not take the planning of. the 
Kainji Dam into consideration. 20 Finally, the demand 
for gasoline was badly estimated. 
After choosing a design and receiving government 
advances against share and loan capital in January 1963, 
BP awarded the refinery contracts. While it is known 
that the project jobs were put out to international ten-
der, nothing is known about the methods used in choosing 
contractors or about the, terms and conditions of the 
/ 
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contracts. 21 The biggest job, worth N£3.9m($.llm) went 
to the British subsidiary of Pro con Ltd, an American 
company which itself is a subsidiary of Universal Oil· 
.Products. Procon' s contract included the crude ·distil-
lation unit, a catalytic reformer for the production of 
high grade gasoline, tankage, control room, utilities, 
engineering services, laboratory, stores, workshops and 
·administration building_ 22 Other companies rec.eiving 
contracts. included George Wiropey (US), B;ritain's Taylor 
Wo·odrow, ·Lloyds' Examiners and Surveyors, X-Ray and 
Gamma-Ray Interpreters, and finally, ·BP Trading which 
supervised every phase of construction. . 
The Port Harcourt plant was operated ·by BP from 
October 1965 to July 1967 when the civil war brought ac-
tivities to a halt. But even during the 21 months of 
operation prior to the shutdown the refinery was affec-
ted by politics. Its formal.opening in January 1966. was 
cancelled due to the first coup_ ·The new head of state, 
General Ironsi, immediately reduced the price of all 
grades of gasoline. 23 The second coun in July 1966 and 
the civil bloodshed of July and septeIDber seriousiy dis-· 
rupted the distribution activities of marketing compan-
ies and interfered with product offtake from the refih-
ery.24 
New·governments tend to revise the iegislation laid 
down by their predecessors. The Ironsi and Gowon regimes, 
impelled by the need for revenue and in line with OPEC 
initiatives in .the international arena~ opened negotia-
tions with oil producing subsidiar.ies during 1966. and 
1967 on pricing, tax and royalty questions. 25 In this 
coneext objections to certain aspects of the Refinery 
and Operating Agreements were raised.· The most serious 
concerns related to cost and the development. of Nigerian 
technical and managerial capabilities. These issues in 
turn were related to the refinery ownership structure 
and pattern of operational control. 
The iS8ue ·of e08t: The costs of technology are notori-
ouslydifficult to measure. This paper does not attempt 
to quantify costs but only to identify cost disadvantages 
on the basis of interview information which is corrobo~ 
r.ated by actual changes in the terms of refinery ·oper-
ation. It is useful to distinguish between direct or 
explicit costs and indirect.or implicit costs. Explicit 
costs are incurred through paying for licencing, capital 
equipment and operating contracts. They are payable in 
hard currency. Implicit costs relate to transfer pric-
ing, trade restrictions and loss of control. They affect 
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the __ .balance of payments through restrictions on exports, 
tying-up of imports and credits, the repatriation of pro-
fits and, in general, the loss of control over the natio-
nal economy. 
Because pre-production phases of the refinery were 
completely in .BP hands, there is virtually no iilf,orma- . 
tion available on the direct costs of equipment, the ser-
vices· of the construction contractors or the licence for 
the Universal Oil products.p1atforming process. In·formants-
long assoc;::iated with· the Port Harcourt plallt state that 
in tl).e case of contracts, price inflation was·, p:n:esent·: ' 
But in the absence of BP records for th~ period, thiS. 
remains· an open question. 26 . " 
The- direct cost of management services was much in-
flated. The fault which led to this situation lay in the 
1962 Operating Agreement which was entirely drawn up and 
made by two representatives of British PetroleUm. A BP 
employee representing NPRC's interests, agreed with a 
representative of BP Trading Ltd on terms according to 
which the Nigerian plant would be operated by the London, 
firm. The Board of Directors' meeting fell short of 
being an effective forum for accountability to Nigerian 
interests because it was chaired by a BP representative 
by virtue of that company's operating role. The chair-
man could, in the case of a six-six voting split, cast 
his second vote and decide the deadlock. The only m~ans 
Board members had of informing themselves on plant oper-
ations was to question the Managing Director-Chairman. 
Ex-Nigerian Board members reported that this avenue for 
invol:vement was less than sati!?factory. '. 
According to the terms of 'the Operating Agreement, 
BP agreed to provide_a Managing Director and other expa-
triate staff, as needed to operate the refinery in a safe 
andoefficient-manner. The staff were to be provided in 
such numbers and for such a period as the company, NPRC, 
considered necessary, • ••• it being understood that such 
expatriate personnel will be replaced by trained and qual-
ified Nigerians as soon as the company deems such replace-
ment feasible.· 27 Remuneration under the terms of the 
Operating Agreement was, for expatriate staff, to. be· ac';';;' 
cording to BP's conditions of Service. The duties of 
these employees were, in the broadest terms, to manage 
the refinery by providing or contracting technical and 
maintenance services, providing supplies, buying abroad 
and managing recruitment, ca:i::'eer development and train-
ing. The Operating Agreement allowed for BP to • ••• arr-
ange for its obligations to be performed by any associ-
ates ••• ' (that is, compani,es in ,which BP owns more than 
/ 
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50% of the ,voting shares) and included an undertaking 
that ' .•• BP shall exercise due diligence in providing 
or procuring the services to be rendered by BP under this 
Agreement and such services shall be in accordance with 
customary practice in the oil industry. '28 
Not only were the terms of the Agreement vague in 
the extreme, but their execution was completely at the 
discretion of BP. There was rio system of accountability. 
Investigations in the late 1960s revealed that the result 
was a high cost to NPRC for management services and the 
discouragement of the development' of Nigerian refining 
capabilities. This manpower situation stemmed from the 
fact that the Managing Director determined total staff 
needs and was free to decide that no suitably trained 
and qualified Nigerians were available. Furthermore in 
the face of Bp's.international policy of personnel 
'localization' there was a staff surplus in BP London. 
The difficulties of retrenchment and redundancy in the 
London office were eased to the extent that excess per-
sonnel could be seconded to Nigeria. Expatriate staff 
stayed longer than the training of Nigerian staff should 
have taken. As pperator, BP had to decide when replace-
ment was feasible with ·the result that the proportion of 
expatriates remained high until the Agreement was revised. 
Finally, the remuneration to individual expatriates was 
high relative.to their UK .incomes, their qualifications 
and the .demands of their jobs. The payment to BP'London 
for supplying a management was very high as is indicated 
by the fact that the oil company accepted a 40% reduction 
under the revised Operating Agreement. 
One of the indirect costs of technology has to do 
with the. overpricing of inputs. 29 This issue can be 
serious if ownership or operating terms allow .. for the 
parent company to supply the subsidi.ary with materials 
and attach an often arbitrary transfer price. As Opera-
tor, BP could decide on the kind, quantity, price and . 
source of supplies and bring them into Nigeria duty free. 30 
For purchasing on behalf of NPRC, BP charged a handling 
fee. The purchasing' procedure routed all orders through 
BP head office, London, which then invoiced the NPRC. BP 
London retained the invoices from original suppliers. 
Widespread cost inflation in transfer prices was confir-
med by investigations into open market or discounted bulk 
prices.31 The revised Operating Agreement incorporated 
some safeguards against price inflation. . 
BP receives discounts as large as· one-third for buy-
ing in bulk. Such trade advantages were not passed on to 
NPRC, although the needs of that company were contribut~ 
ing to the size pf BP'S bulk orders. Tetraethyl lead, 
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an expensive additive for upgrading gasoline octane, is 
obtained by- BP from Associated--Octel--in--which BP has -a 
shareholding. The discount was not passed on' to NPRC. 
Charges levied by BP for shipping .materials from the UK 
were much higher than tnose charged by commercial ship-
ping agents. An inventory of the Port Harcourt refinery 
stores revealed considerable over-supplying and the stock-
ing of materials not needed in the refinery operation 
but which were brought in duty-free. BP has. buying agree-
ments with 'brother' companies which are often subsidi-
aries or UK-owned. Nigerian refinery demands were direc-
ted towards these firms while local linkages were neglec-
ted. 32 
Another indirect cost of the transfer of· technology 
to the first refinery derived from restrictions on trade, 
in this case .on the export of petroleum products. BP 
was willing to set up a refinery geared to the internal 
market but was not prepared to construct an export-ori-
ented plant geared to the West African product markets 
because these could be supplied more profitably from the 
majors' own export refineries. In addition, the cost of 
shipping products from Nigeria to neighbouring countries, 
in the absence of a national tanker fleet, virtually 
rules out the project. A second trade restriction deri-
Ning from the terms of technology transfer was the exclu-
sive right BP had to undertake purchasing for the oper-
ation. 
One example will suffice to illustrate how another, 
type of implicit cost, loss of control in favour of the 
supplier, can be burdensom. Port Harcourt is a proces-
sing refinery: the NPRC owns no crude and no products. 
It charges a fee for refining crude Qwnedby the market-
ers. 33 This arrangement was agreed between Shell and ' 
BP and the five other companies marketing in Nigeria. 34 
This was to the advantage of the other marketers since 
if BP-Shell operated a crude and product owning refinery 
it could supply products to the BP ,and Shell marketing 
subsidiaries on favourable terms. Similarly if the 
government had an interest in a crude and product-owning 
refinery it would be well placed to exclude foreign firms 
from the local products market. In 'the early 1960s 
there was some controversy among the companies over whe-
ther BP-Shell should run an owning or a processing plant 
and the dangers of those firms increasing their share of 
the Nigerian ,market were the former choice made. But 
when the other companies threatened to retaliate in kind 
outside Nigeria, Shell andBP readily agreed to establish 
a processing refinery. The government had no part in 
this decision by the companies that Port Harcourt would 
I 
( 
J 
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be a processing refinery. It was to the disadvantage of 
. public interest in two ways. First, the government could 
not control what products were produced in the refinery, 
what amonnts were produced or the destination of the pro-
ducts. Second, the refinery profit margin was fixed at 
15%. Thus even if .the government wished to.managethe 
NPRC as a profit-making firm, it was constrained within 
the limits of profitability. All other components of 
profitability were passed on to the marketing companies. 
LoaaZ saienae and teahnoZogy aapabiZities: BP.was re-
luctant to reduce its operating role by replacing expa-
triate staff with trained Nigerian personnel. Because 
the pace of Nigerianization was left to BP under the 
terms for operating the pla·nt, its pace was slow. 35 
For example, as ·late as March 1971, of the 63 senior 
staff at the supervisory level and above, only 17 or 20% 
were Nigerian. Of the total staff of 321, 47 were expa-
triates in 1971. 36 The government found this rate of 
transfer unacceptable and took action which by 1973 re-
sulted in the reduction of expatriate staff ·to 4% or 10 
out of 408. comptete Nigerianization was planned for 
1976.37 
. The terms of transfer. discouraged the development 
of local research and development facilities. BP called 
on head offi.ce resources to .solve the most elementary 
problems. Opportunities for Nigerians to gain familiar-
ity with local crude oil characteristics were foregone. 
Finally, very few local suppliers of materials and ser-
vices were patronized by the BP management with the re-
sult that after almost a ~ecade the refining company had 
established virtually no linkages with the Nigerian econ-
omy. 
Between 1967 and 1973 changes were made in the terms 
of operation. A revised Refinery Ag;reement(1972) brought 
together these government reforms. The changes were 
brought .about by Nigerian members of the NPRC Board of 
Directors who had been appointed in 1967-by the military 
regime. Some of these new appointees had previously' been 
refinery employees in technical capacities. They and 
other new board members were. spokesmen for Nigerian staff· 
whose frustrations had accumulated under BP management 
and acquiescent Nigerian civil servants and politicians 
who had no technical knowledge of refining. Members of 
the Board before the 1966 coup had been political·appoin-
tees with no special interests in the business of re-
fining. In contrast the military appointees were techno-
crats with financial and engineering expertise as well 
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Table 1 
Emptoyment in the Nigerian Petroteum 
-Refining Co.-L"td-as or-3TMardh ]9'11;:-
categories Nigerians non-Nigerians 
management 
professional 
intermediate and supervisory 
clerical and secretarial 
skilled labour 
unskilled labour 
others 
Total 
7 
1.0 
50 
182 
15 
10 
4 
9 
33 
1 
47 
;:Source: Federal Ministry of Mines and Power, 
Division of Petroleum Resourqes, AnnuatReport 
19'10-'11 (Lagos: Federal Ministry of Information), 
Table 14, p. 32. 
as some top level military officers. As a group these 
Director's were accustomed to expect efficiency and ac-
countability at all stages. They requested the opera-
tor ·to release records and brought basic information on 
refinery operations before government ministeries for 
the first time. Those records were used in a concerted 
campaign to lobby government support for majority owner-
ship and revised Refining and Operating Agreements. 38· 
The revised terms took effect from 1 October 1971. 
The most fundamental cha~ge was in ownership structure. 
The state became the majority shareholder by acquiring 
.-10% of equity from BP and Shell who were left with 20%· 
each. In line with 60% state ownership, the new settle-
ment provided for a Nigerian Managing Director, Chair-
man and refinery manager~ it spelled out the government's 
policy·oh Nigerianization of personnel and provided time-
tables leading to complete local operation. The Board 
of Directors was empowered to review and revise the ex-
patriate salary budget and, in general, to monitor oper-
ating costs and import prices. Staff size was increased 
to 400 and the maintenance function was no longer con-
tracted out. In addition, the government froze the 
price of crude oil which Shell-BP supplied to the refin-
ery at about $1.90, the original level negotiated in 
-1962.39 A new technical department for research and 
development was established as part of the Port Harcourt 
refinery, the aim being to produce solutions to problems 
locally rather than import them. 
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CASE II: THE WARRI REFINERY 
In late'1976'Nigeria's second refinery is about to be 
constructed. It will likely be on stream somewhat later 
than October 1977, the date announced by the government 
in 1975. In comparison with the first refinery, the 
Warri' project is very much under Nigerian control. This 
difference reflects a gradual accumulation of experience, 
changes in Nigerian government policy and new forces 
within the world oil industry. 
Three developments contributed to the formation of 
a cadre of experienced Nigerian refiners. First, involve-
ment in the production phase at Port Harcourt yielded 
trained chemical engineers and other personnel able to 
run a refinery. Second, the process of revising the 
1962 Refining and Operating Agreements and putting the 
new terms into effect fostered a certain amount of tech-
nocratic and managerial competence. Third, the task of 
fueling the Biafran war effort provided further experi-
ence. Products were produced in the captur.ed Port 
Harcourt refinery for some months from July 196740 and 
later in several simple crude distilleries erected ion 
Biafran territory. The Biafran refiners, many of them 
trained in the Port Harcourt plant,41 effectively set 
up refineries under wartime conditions. They undertook 
research to improve quality and extend the range of pro-
ducts. These 'efforts went some way towards dispelling 
the myth that refining technology was beyond the immedi-
ate capacity of Nigerians. 
The gradual build-up of refinery personnel, and con-
fidence was reinforced by new government policy on for-
eign investment. Like the Balewa regime of the civilian 
era, Gowon's military government favoured a strong pri-
vate sector. The innovation of the early 1970s was the 
requirement that Nigerian businessmen have a significant 
participating interest. 42 Further, the Second National 
Development ~lan (1970-74) stipulated that major pro-
jects, especially those in the oil sector, be at least 
55% government-owned. 43 The state's policy of pragmatic 
economic nationalism reflects the government's perception 
of ,a greater ne,ed for management and ,technology than for 
investment. capital. ' 
The central role of the state in the new refinery 
project ~lso has to do with the move in the early 1970s 
from an international crude surplus to a shortage. It 
was clearly evident by late 1972 that the buyer's market 
in crude oil had been transformed into a sell'ers' market. 
Some discussion of the great changes in the international 
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oil industry is warranted since Nigeria has become a 
major crude exporter, ranking third in 1976. 
The 'revolution' in the petroleum industry has to 
do with the ownership of crude oil. Beginning in October 
1972 OPEC member governments took control of oil company 
exploration and production subsidiaries operating in 
their countries through the buying of majority interest. 
Governments thus have control over crude oil and can reg-
ulate the volume produced and the price charged. Posted 
price increases and sales of government participation 
crude at high prices have vastly increased revenues from 
oil. Producing countries are therefore well placed to 
spend on programmes of industrialization. Since hydro-
carbons are under government control, ·an obvious indus-
trialization strategy is to add value to the crude and 
thereby produce petroleum products· for local consumption 
and export. This is the context of a trend ' ••• towards 
increased control by producer governments over the in-
ternational oil trade, through the construction of state-
owned or state controlled export refineries of the lar-
gest possible scale. ,44 Oil-importing countries are 
also concerned about secure product supplies, and in 
1973-75 this concern was for ·some importers particularly 
intense. There was a move in the early 1970s to build 
up refining capacity in the importing countries (to the 
extent that they could secu~e guaranteed supplies of 
crude) and to open markets to product exports from oil 
producing countries. In short, concern for industriali-
zation and security of supply led many countries to ini-. 
tiate the construction of refineries and it appeared that 
a refinery-building boom was imminent. 45 . . 
Ownership: Local manpower availability and the world 
demand for petroleum were factors which figured in the 
government's decision to own 100% of Nigeria's second 
refinery. But additional political and economic consid-
erations led the Federal Executive Council; Nigeria's 
top policy-making organ, to decide on recommendations 
from the Ministry of Mines and Power in March 1973 that 
the second refinery would be 100% state-owned. The 
state was participating to the extent of 60% in the first 
refinery. A wholly public undertaking would bean im-
provement on that. As a crude-expor.ting country,. Nigeria 
was in a good bargaining position to obtain technology 
without having to compensate the supplier with equity. 
Since the refinery was for the local market there was no 
pressure to yield participation to an international oil 
company in order to secure export o1,ltlets and the. use of 
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Table 2 
Compositi'on 0'fFe'de'X"a 'l' 'Go'v'e'X"nm'e'nt Revenue: 
ot'l 'an'd 'no'n'-'o'i''l' 's'o'u'X"(!'e'8' '1'9'7'0';"71 
to' ,19'7'5-'16 tn' p'e'X"o'e'n't'ailes, 
fiscal year total revenue oil revenue non-oil revenue 
1970-71 100 27.4 72.6 
1971-72 100 50.2 49.8 
1972-73 100 40.9 59.1 
1973-74 100 ,62.0 38.0 
1974-75 100 84.4 15.6 
, 1975-76 100 95.0 5.0 
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria 
Table 3 
Rate8 of GX'olilth of ReaU'X'X"en't FedeX'a'l Revenues 
.' '197"4-6 (N'OOOs') 
fiscal year total revenue oil receipts non-oil receipts 
amount % amount % amount '% 
1970-1 
1'971-2 
1972-3 
1973...:.4, 
1!l74-:5 
1976* 
556,910 100.0' 152i284 100.0,404,626,100.0 
1,410,911 254.5 ,', '707,522 ,465.1 703,388 173.6 
, 1,389,9il 249.6 569,397374.3_820,514 202.7 
1,569,974 261.9 974,293 640.8.595,681 147.2 
3,121,,761.560';5 ,2,635,941'1734.2 485,820 120.0 
5,010;520 899.7 4,760,006 3120.0 425,895 105.2 
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria 
*Finanaia'l Times (8 March 1976) report 
from United States Treasury figures 
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a marketing network. Crude exports'had provided revenue 
in quantities sufficient to eliminate the need for for-
eign capital investment. As oil came to dominate the 
Nigerian economy itscontroi by the state became politi-
cally more important. By 1973 oil provided four-fifths 
of total exportva1ue46 and by 1975-76, 95% of federal 
revenue. In the five years between 1970-71 and 1974-75 
total recurrent revenue had increased nine ti.rites. This 
was the reisu1 t of .. oil revenue increasing 31 times' and 
of an increase in non-oil revenues of just one~fifth. 
Clearly oil had become such a powerful economic force 
that to leave it in the control of foreign companies 
would call into question the country's political inde-
pendence. But perhaps the most important single reason 
for complete state ownership was the government's deci-
sion to supply the Nigerian economy with low cost fuel 
and to control the local energy market. This objective 
requires that the state develop an integrated oil indus-
try, a policy which in 1974 had gained prominence within 
OPEC. This decision by the state to completely own the 
refinery was taken in an oil industry context of capital 
shortage. Oil companies were showing a preference for 
service and technical contracts while leaving investments 
to OPEC member governments. 47 
One hundred percent ownership of the crude-owning 
refinery is a logical corollary of state involvement in 
oil production and crude marketing. 48 The state owns 
crude which is obtained at no more than the cost produc-
tion. 49 . This crude can be refined at about 80 cents a 
barre1'and the. products sold in states outlets .at prices' 
based on' political and economic calculations. In this 
integrated operation government price decisions are based 
not on cash flows geared to the most rapid return on in-
vestment, but on broad considerations of development need 
and social benefit. Given the normal commercial impera-
tives of an oil company, a refinery partnership could 
involve basic disagreements over company policy. 
Proo.ieat initiation: 'State ownership does not translate 
automatically into national control of the process of 
selecting and transferring technology. Nor does govern-
ment control guarantee that citizens get the most appro-
priate technology on the least expensive terms and in 
such a way as to encourage local technological. develop-
ment. 
In 1967 the Ministry of Mines and Power was aware 
that the Port Harcourt refinery would not meet local 
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demand levels beyond 1973 if demand increased by 8% per 
annum. More refinery capacity was necessary by the be-
ginning of 1974. But a considerable period of time elap-
sed before the pre-production phase of the new refinery 
project got underway. During this interim the govern-
ment received unsolicited proposals for a 55,000 bd ref-
inery from Mobil, Texaco, CFP (French Petroleum companY)6 
Agip, the Japan Consulting Institute and from BP-Shell. 5 
The revised Port Harcourt Refinery Agreement stipulated 
that ' •.• within three years from October 1, 1971 the 
NPRC must consider the economic feasibility of additional 
capacity and of making additions to manufacture other 
petroleum products for the Nigerian market. '51 In 1971 
BP and Shell submitted a detailed proposal to build a 
55,000 bd plant. near Lagos, costing £14.5 or about $40.6m, 
to be ' .•• owned, managed and operated by the Nigerian-
Petroleum Refining Company Ltd. '52 . 
Among those who had political influence within the 
Federal Military Government, refinery location was a con-
troversial point. The BP-Shell proposal had selected 
South Lagos after comparing the costs of four alternative 
locations. The government decided to submit six:possible 
sites to an independent consultancy firI)l hired.by.the 
Ministry of Mines and .Power. The.French company BEICIP 
(the French Petroleum Institute's Bureau of Industrial 
Studies) was hired in 1971 and in that year the Federal 
Executive Council received its recommendations. Adeci-
sion onWarri in the Mid-West State was finally made in' 
1973. . 
There were further delays due to decisions to in-
crease the refinery's capacity. In i973 it was thought 
that a 65,000 bd plant would.be adequate,. but by August 
1974 it was announced that Nigeria's second refinery 
would process 100,000 barrels of crude a day. This 54% 
increase in refinery :size can be partly explained by re-
sponse to extremely rapid growth in local demand for 
petroleum products. Consumption increased by 72.2% be-
tween 1970 and 1973 rather than .by 24% as was anticipa-
ted by planners counting on an eight % annualconsump-
tion increase. 
Nigerians consumed more oil products than was antic-
ipated for several reasons. Road construction and im-
provements, increased vehicle imports, industrial expan-
sionand the introduction of uniform prices for six pe-
troleum products on 15 October 1973 are important fac-' 
tors, but one further explanation for this amazing rate 
of growth is product smuggling to neighbouring countries 
where prices are much higher than in Nigeria. 
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Table. 4 
. ·Co·n·s·u·nip·t·i·o:n 'of z'e'/i'n'e'd' 'p'z'o'du'(its 
. 'i;ri 'ivii/iiria: '1'970-4 . 
year consumption percentage 
'OOObd increase 
1970 28.4 
20.S 1971 34.3 
1972 39.8 16.0 
1973!1f 48.9 22;"9· 
1974 68~0 35~0 
Source: A. A. Kubbah, OPEC Pdst ·and 
Pre'se'nt (Vienna: Petro-economic ·research 
cen-he, 1974), Table 4, p. 166. 
!If . 
expected consumption 
A. semi-paakageq. transfer.: After the government had set-
tled on the Warri location in early 1973 the second,re-
finery Project Team was setup within the 'new Nigerian 
National Oil Corporation. However, by August 1974 the 
project was moved outside the National. Oil Corporation's 
jurisdiction by the Ministry of Mines and Power. The 
Project.Team, Six-strong in late 1974, had its own bud-
get and vote of funds directly from the Ministry. of 
Finance.. The Team was charged with monitoring the en-
tire project from the consultancy stage to conuniss·ion.ing. 
BEICIP, having proved cOoperative in assessing. al-
ternative refinery locations and having produced a com-
prepensive four-volume site optimization study in 1971, 
was kept on. The consultancy agreement between BEICIP 
and the Project Team could be described as a semi~pack­
aged arrangement for transfering refinery technology •. 
A semi-packaged deal·is one·which involves the monitor-
ing intervention'of a:·third party between· the buyer and 
the seller of technology. The third party, BEICIP, is 
charged with working in the interests of the recipient 
and is paid to do so. While several firms may contract 
to provid!'! the Warr.i refinery with materials and services, 
BEICIP advises on their selection. . Depending on its 
initiative, the Project Team can have more or less of a 
role in the choice of suppliers and in the. negotiation 
of terms. Because the Project Team is neither acting 
directly nor placing the tota:lproject in the hands of 
- 21 -
an outside company, it is appropriate to describe the 
transfer as semi-packaged. 
The consultant and the Project Team chose a spec- . 
ific site in Warri. After the project scheme was pre-
pared the two parties elected process licences. Proces-
ses were chosen on the basis of economic considerations. 
IFP (French Petroleum Institute), the parent company of 
BEICIP, supplied the crude oil analysis and BEICIP rec-
ommended the optimal processes after examining unit cap-
abilities, product yields and operating costs. In some 
cases the.advantagesand disadvantages of a process were 
discussed by the two parties before they agreed to ac-
quire it. In .another case, talks were opened with a li-
cencer on the consultant's recommendation but were dis-
continued by the Project Team. Below is a list of pro-
cess units specified by the Project scheme and the com-
panies which are selling their process licences: 53 
Proaess units 
crude distillation unit 
catalytic reformer 
catalytic cracker 
Merox unit (for purifying 
gas and LPG from catalytic 
cracker) 
unisar (for kerosene 
hydrogenation) 
Proaess Ziaenaer 
not licenced 
IFP (France) 
Kellogg (USA) 
Universal Oil Products 
(USA) 
Union Oil of California 
(USA) 
Of a total plant cost of N150m (US$243m), licences 
for the four processes cost about N2m ($3.24m) or 1.5%. 
For each process there were several suppliers and the 
supply of process units is not tied to the supply of the 
licence. Each licencer has guaranteed that his .process 
will produce a specified yield. The project team com-
missioned the process licencers to prepare design speci-
fications for vltal parts of the process units. The li-
cencers provided a list of fabricators for these special 
parts from which the project team made a selection. 
Having decided on the general refinery deSign, the pro-
cess units and the licences, the project team and BEICIP 
began in 1973 to choose a contractor for the main· refin-
ery plant. Pre-qualification documents were completed 
by some 20 firms, three of which indicated their willing-
ness to submit fixed cost rather than cost-plus·bids. 
With the project team supplying the philisophy, BEICIP 
prepared tender documents which spelt-out details of the 
project for which bids were being sought. In October 
1974 the tender documents were given to three contrac~ 
tors who were expected to submit bids by February·1975. 
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On 27 October 1975 EN1, the Italian state oil corpora-
tion, announced that Snam ProgettT, lTs-sllosidIaiy,--had 
been awarded a UKE285 mil!l.ion contract to build the Warri 
refinery.55 In twelve months the refinery's cost had 
escalated at least 157%.. It was not until April 1976 
that ENI formally signed the contract which was then 
estimated to be worth US$500.million. 56 
The issue of apppoppiate teahnoZogy:Given Nigerian 
needs, how appropriate. is the Warri refinery design? 
The decision to locate the plant at Warri may be uneco-
nomic. A British Petroleum and Shell study in 1971 in-
dicated that Warri was the most costly of four locations 
because of the need for expensive facilities to remove 
and distribute the petroleum products. After controv-. 
ersyand delay over siting the· refinery, BEICIP was hired 
to recommend among six sites. Federal ministries exam-
ined the Site Optimization Study and in March 1972 for-
warded recommendations to the Ministry of Mines and 
Power and to the Federal Executive Council. Nhilei BEICIP 
did not recommend the Warri location, effective criti-. 
cisms were made of the data used by the French consul-
tant in rejecting the site. The decision on Warri may 
involve higher costs than, for instance, Lagos but it 
has advantages such as industry dispersal for security 
and development purposes. The deadlock in the Federal 
Executive Council over siting continued for almost two 
years and cost Nigeria millions of naira. It was resol-
ved in 1973 only when a decision was made to build two 
refineries: one at Warri in bhe Bendel State to the 
South and one at Kaduna in the northern Kaduna state. 
Nigeria's third, 70-75 thousand bd refinery is expected 
to cost N190m and be commissioned ih 1980 •. 
The inclusion of a catalytic cracking unit in the 
Warri refinery design may be inappropriate. It is by 
far the most expensive piece of equipment, accounting 
fora third of the refinery battery's capital cost and 
a third of·operating c.Qsts. The catalytic cracker ena-
bles the refining process to produce larger volumes of 
~igh grade gasoline by separating cuts of fuel oil. But 
the need for high octane· gasoline in the Nigerian market 
is slight, although consumption habits and a premium-
regular price differential of less than four kobo (100 
kobo to a naira) a gallon57 encourage a preference for 
it, even for low combustion engines in motorcycles and 
volkswagons. . 
A further difficulty with catalytic cracking 
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Table 5 
CapitaZ 'a'ost'so! 'd '5'5';000· 'bod ):ie'[in3X'Y' 'in four ·Zoaa~ion_s 
, T9n ·Cm'-{Z'Z'{o'n's' 'of 'Na':t'X"a) 
location refinery 
plant 
crude supply and 
product offtake 
total cost 
Port Harcourt 
South Lagos 
North Lagos 
Warri 
14.20 
23.50 
19.80 
20.88 
1.30 
·5.55 
21.12 
30.00 
Source: British Petroleum Development Co. Ltd 
and Shell NV, Nig·el:'i'd: kddi't·ionaZ 
Refinery' 'Cajida'Ity (Lagos 197-1) 
15.60 
29.00 
40.18 
50.60 
relates to the bonding characteristics of Nigerian crude. 
The crude oil has been found to be highly resistant to 
cracking by British Petroleum and other refiners. 58 It 
produces only 8-15% additional gasoline instead of 25% 
more after cracking as does the ·average lUddle' East 
Crude. These considerations have given rise to ques-
tions abqut the ·inclusion of a catalytic cracker in the 
new refinery. Among ,the explanations for the purchase 
of what is thought by some to be inappropriate refining 
technology are that planners and the project team may 
not be fully versed in the relevant technical details. 59 
Again, there is evidently a degree of 'revenue permis-
siveness' at play.60 Prestige associated with having 
sophisticated process units and thus a complex rather 
than a simple refinery, may be a factor on the same .lev-
el as the habit of using premium gasoline for all vehic-
les. Finally .planner's may be ill-advised by their con-
sultants and the possibility that technocrats are moti-
vated to acquire inappropriate technology deliberately 
cannot be ruled out. In October 1975 the Nli!.liJ Nigerian 
editorialized against inclusion of the catalytic cracker 
in the Warri plant and suggested that transportation 
economics would better justify its being part of the 
northern Kaduna refinery.61 
Among the arguments for the appropriateness of the 
catalytic cracker in the Warri refinery are the claim 
by Kellogg, the supplier, that flexible design enables 
its unit to deliver the percentage yield of gasoline 
desired. The company's bid was tied to a specific yield 
and the process was guaranteed. Again the cracking unit 
will eliminate the export of low sulphur fuel oil for 
heating purposes since this heavy. oil will be cracked 
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for gasoline and aromatics used in petrochemcials. That 
it will reduce the problem of distillation residue dJ.s,,;, 
posal in Warri is a final pOint in favour of including 
the catalytic cracker in the second refinery. 
The development of loaal saienae and teahnology 
aap'abilities: Technology is being acquired in such a 
way as to increase Nigerian involvement relative to the 
Port Harcourt project. The Warri project team is com-
mitted to using 19cal contractors, especially for civil 
engineering, whenever possible. Experience gained from 
the Warri project will enable Nigerian refinery planners 
to undertake a larger and more complex role in the next 
refinery. Technology is being transferred "in a semi-
packaged form through necessity. Given that there is 
local experience in the operating, but not in the pro-
cess design or construction phase~ an unpackaged ar-
rangement would amount to NigerAans shopping for tech-
nology in the world market but not knowing what to buy. 
Were the project team buying a total package they would 
not be gaining experience of monitoring the project. 
Thus, semi-packaging seems to be a useful arrangement 
under the circumstances. The fact that the p~oject team 
chose Snam Proggetti for the building contract rather 
than a "French associate of the consultants BEICIP indi-
cates that it is exercising some independent judgement. 
The issue of aost: It can be argued that the refinery 
project is too costly given the relative prices of Ni-
gerian crude oil and imported products. Nigeria pro-
duces one of the highest quality crudes in the world 
and this is reflected in its price. In 1975 a barrel of 
petroleum products in demand in Nigeria could be impor-
ted for around $11.00. Since local crude can be sold 
for some $12.50, local refining involves a net foreign 
exchange loss of at least $1.50 a barrel~ It is "clear 
that the state has deliberately chosen to bear a substan-
tial reduction in revenue in order to develop a local 
refining capacity designed to supply the Nigerian econ-
omy with cut-rate fuel and petroleum products. Security 
of supply is perhaps as important as low prices to the 
consumer. Nigeria would, for example, find it diffic~lt 
to support an OPEC or AOPEC programme of crude production 
control or selectiye exports if the country were depen-
dent on external suppliers for petroleum products; In 
the case of another oil shortage, would product-short 
Europe continue exporting to Nigeria while that country 
- 25 -
is itself contributing to the shortage by withholding 
crude? Local refining capacity increases the flexibil-
ity of Nigerian foreign policy and decreases the costs 
of maintaining OPEC unity. But for the general popu-
lation loc.al refining holds the hope of relief from 
chronic petrol shortages which have immobilized the 
country regularly since eCl.;rJ.yJ.~74. 
Tne most serious and intractable cost problem has 
to do with the terms of trade. Inflation is probably 
the biggest obstacle in technology transfer today. A 
quarter of a billion dollars for a ]:00,000 bd refinery 
was extremely expensive in 1974 but this cost was doub-
led by 1975. Inflation has hit refinery equipment es-
pecially hard. Steel prices have risen steeply and short-
ages have been experienced. Capital goods for refining 
doubled in cost.between 1970 and 1974 but doubled again 
in the space of a year. 63 In 1975 it was estimated.that 
for each year of d~lay in getting the Warri refinery on 
stream, the overall cost of the project will increase 
by· one-third. . -Delays are endemic because of raw mater-
ial shortages and a building boom in the oil sector. 
This staggering rate of inflation is quickly eroding the 
purchasing power of Nigeria's oil dollar and hence the 
country's potential for industrialization. 
CONCLUSION. 
It is clear that significant changes have occurred in 
the process of acquiring refihery technology over the 
past decade in Nigeria •. With regard to ownership struc-
ture, there has been a move from accepting 50% foreign 
partiqipation.coupled with operatibnal control to the 
present policy of 100%·public ownership with active state 
involvement. While the first refinery was completely 
packaged, the Warri project is semi-packaged. For the 
current refinery a Nigerian project team .has selected. a 
design, negotiated licence terms, commissionedfabrica-
tiondesignsand chosen contractors to erect the plant 
- all under the. guidance of a French consultancy firm. 
Chapges in ownership and degree o.f packaging have 
implications for planning objectives and choice of tech-
nology •. In the case of the second-refinery, planning is 
more app~opriate to national needs. The new 100~000 bd 
refinery is geared.to a large expanding market while the 
first plant was designed to opeI;'ate at full capacity al-
most at once, thus ensuring a rapid return on investment 
at .the expense of capacity shortfalls ·and the need for 
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~plant expansion.- -Because of-inappropriate -planning, 
products from the first refinery were ill-matched to 
consumption patterns largely because fuel oil amounting 
to two-fifths of production was not used widely for 
industrial or heating purposes in Nigeria. Thenew 
Warri plant will minimize fuel oil yie;I.d and maximize 
the production of gasoline, but at the expense of in-
stalling a catalytic cracker. Finally, the Warri plant 
is appropriate in .terms of national security. Self-
sufficiency in products supply goes some way toward jus-
tifying the project's immense cost. -In conjunction 
with the Port Harcourt and Kaduna refineries, the Warri 
plant will produce a volume of products ca9able of sat-
isfying even the 25-30% increases in product consumption 
presently being recorded. Increased exports to Niger, 
Chad, Dahomey, Ghana and Benin (formerly Togo) will be 
possible. Since the production pattern is geared to 
the Nigerian market, the need for imports will be much 
diminished. This self-sufficiency enhances Nigerian 
security and makes an independent policy on crude pro-
duction, priCing and use more feasible. 
The direct and indirect costs of the second refin-
ery are much higher than those of the first, but the 
state .has more control over £hem~ High costs are the 
result of extremely high rates of inflation, the larger 
size of the Warri refinery, and inclusion of an expen~ 
sive catalytic cracking unit. Increased control over 
costs follows from the project team's direct involvement 
in all phases of implementation. Be.cause· a Nigerian 
public refining company will operate and manage the 
plant, albeit with foreign technical.assistance initia.., 
IIYt transfer pricing, inflated invoicing and other. such 
practices can be checked. In contrast, the organization 
of the Port Harcourt plant gave British Petroleum con-
trol over purchases and operation. Despite·some abuses, 
British Petroleum did operate an efficient refinery 
which yielded a return on investment after seven years, 
of which four were years of actual operation. It re-
mains to be seen whether public con·trol of costs will 
be linked with spending discipline in the new project. 
. The second refinery is more consciously geared to 
encouraging the local development of science· and ·tech-
nology than was the first. On the principle· that you. 
learn by doing, Nigerian personnel are involved in all 
phases, from process design to construction and opera-
tion. As a result of the first refinery and the dis·til-
lation activities in Biafra, there are Nigerians Trlith 
considerable experience in refinery operation. There 
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is less experience in construction and virtually none 
in process design. Nigerians are now involved in each 
phase but there is increased reliance on consultants 
in the more com!'lex stages.. It is expected that this 
involvement will produce an experienced team capable 
of establishing the country's next refinery with even 
less outside assistance. The turnkey nature of·the 
first refinery contrasts with the current project which 
is guided by the conviction that the fastest way to 
transfer technical knowledge is to take charge and re-
ceive advice. Nigerian staff for the new refinery, some 
500 personnel for four shifts, are being recruited from 
the·Port Harcourt plant and from abroad, others are 
being trained in universities, technical schools and in 
other refineries.· Foreign management and technical 
advisers are under contract for a specified and limited 
time to provide services and train their replacements. 
Such contracts oriented towards developing indigenous 
technical capacities are very different from the. 1962 
British Petroleum Operating Agreement which, while ac-
cepting local takeover in principle, delayed indigeni-
zation as much as possible in practice. 
Nigerian technical and material inputs into both 
refineries have been minimal. Equipment is.not fabri-
cated in the country and it is said that contractors 
of sufficient sophistication are not available. ·A study 
of available manufactur.ing and engineering capabilities 
would resolve the question of what actually is availa-
ble. Beyond this, it would seem that the principle of 
learning by doing is just as applicable to the skills 
of fabricating.and construction as it is to project. or-
ganization. While a commitment to use Nigerian mater-
ials and expertise would ·increase ·the overall complex-
ity of the project, since dozens of ancillary firms 
would need to be encouraged, such an approach could in-
·crease the rate of technological development immensely. 
Furthermore the view is widely held in Nigeria that 10-
cal competence is passed over for foreign firms which 
in some cases are less capable than their Nigerian coun-
terparts. 
The main reason for the changes which occurred in 
the process of acquiring refinery technology is the de-
velopment of local refining expertise. Great increases 
in the numbers of university graduates, especially in 
physics, chemistry and engineering, added to the pool 
of technological knowhow. The numbers of Nigerians 
with working experience in the Fort Harcourt refinery 
and more important in the 17 oil exploration and pro-
ducing companies active in the country, added further 
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to local qompetence. 
A number of changes" in the international, and' na,""" 
tionalcontexts have inade thei aggressive role of the 
state ·possible. First, the civil war ended with a 
strong federal state. Due to petroleum profits tax,' 
the Federal Military Government soon· controlledrelati1;i1;!-
Ily larg.e'. amounts of. revenue and coulq' pay for 100% o.f 
a very expensive.·proJect and thus control it. Second, 
Nigeria has. i:tbundaiit·crude oil which by virtue of. govern-
ment participation in the equity of producing companies, 
is partly under state control. Cr.ude at cost is avail-
able'for local refining. Given that. three-quarters or 
moreof product cost is due to the cost of crude', and 
due to the disrupted nature of international trade in 
petroleum products in 1974, local refining made economic 
and political sense. Third, Nigeria as a member of 'OPEC 
is influenced by that body's policy recommendation to 
process hydrocarbons locally to the greatest extent pos-
sible. 64 The emergence of a sellers' market from 1972 
made this policy most attractive. Finally, the acquisi-
tion of technology for the Warri refinery has. been much 
facilitated by the increasing availability of consultants, 
process licencers and equipment suppliers. There is no 
monopoly on 'middle-aged' refinery technology of stan-
dard specification. In fact, in a drive to obtain stable 
supplies of crude or products, oil companies were com-
peting to supply downstream technology .. to producing. coun-
tries. 
Gains have been made~in the orocess of technology 
'transfer in the decade separating- the two refining pro-
jects. But there is cause for concern in at lea'st two ' 
areas. First, in the 1974-75 and 1975-76 fiscal years~ 
Nigeria will not be able to usefully deploy all oil in~ 
come because of a lack of absorptive capacity. This 
contributes to a tendency towards 'revenue permissive-, 
ness' which is evident in connection with the Warri re-
finery. By including a hard-to-justify catalytic crac-
ker, capital and operating expenses were increased by a 
third. Again, the choice of Warri as a refinery loca-
tion was perhaps uneconomic. However, the revelations 
of wholesale corruption and private. appropriation of 
public funds which followed the July 1975 coup removing 
General Gowon, have changed the yardstick with whidh one 
measures wasteful expenditure. The spending on the 
Warri refinery may be ill-advised and 'excessive but rel-
ative to spectacular waste such as the one or two billion 
dollar cement scandal,65 the refinery project stands 
vindicated as it will eventually provide tangible, goods 
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for which there is demand. 
A second area for concern relates to rapid infla-
tion in the cost of refinery equipment and of capital 
equipment in general. Inflation of 25% a year betw.een 
·1970 and 1974 and perhaps twice that since for refinery 
materials erodes the buying power of oil dollars very 
quickly. A single poor country has little bargaining 
power when it comes to inflation. OPEC has issued warn-
ings on price hikes and in 1975 even seriously discussed 
the possibility of indexing crude prices and seeking 
payment in SORs (special drawing rights from the Inter-
national Monetary Fund) rather than in dollars. But as 
yet no coherent OPEC strategy has emerged for counter-
ing price increases by industrial exporters. This points 
to the fact that even after poor countries build a local 
foundation in science and technology and acquire tech-
nical knowhow and bargaining skills, the escalating 
price of technology IIli11 continue to pose an immense 
barrier to its acquisition. Equity .in the terms of trade 
has become a political issue which can be .taken up .on1y 
by groups of countries, most usefully within an inter-
national body such as the United Nations and its agen-
cies. 
How have the changes in:. the process. of technology 
transfer affected the foreign investor who supplies tech-
nology? The refinery case .studies suggest a pattern of 
behaviour based on company-government interaction. 
British Petroleum entered the refining industry in Ni-
geria under attractive terms which promised the company 
a fair return on investment. The period during which 
Nigerians gained more understanding of the industry was 
the oil company's techno10gica:L.·1ead time. In that in-
terim British Petroleum aggressively maximized its com-
mercial advantages by all possible means. We have seen 
how transfer pricing, inflated salaries, overstocking 
and overall planning to BP objectives constituted costs 
to Nigerians but were consistent with the oil company's 
commercial interests. Meanwhile the agencies of the 
state gained experience and confidence while Nigerian 
technicians, newly out of school when the project began, 
reached career maturity and were ready for reanagement 
responsibilities. Experience in Nigeria and elsewhere 
shows that IIlhen companies maximize· the.ir advantage, a 
national backlash develops and takes the form 6f nation-
alization, exclusion of the firm from new ventures, or 
some kind of state regulation. The Refinery Agreement 
(1962) and the terms of operation were revised by a 
government which has refused to consider further joint 
- 30 -
activities with British Petroleum. More judicious hand-
J,Arlg. O~ j:,I:te. Pprt._Harcour.t_plant would_have. given the com-
pany an edge over others in future projects in the. oil 
sector. 
NOTES 
1. Data were collected in Nigeria and London during 
1974 and 1975 from interviews and documents. The 
refinery 'comparison is selective due to the need to 
limit discussion to a few important points and be-
cause .thesecond refinery reached the construction 
stage only in 1976. 
2. Carlos Anez, 'Science, Technology and Underdevelop-
ment: review and synthesis' (The Science Policy 
Research Unit, University of Sussex; August 1973), 
mimeo. 
3. C. Cooper and.F. Sercovitch, 'Channels and Mechanisms 
for the Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries' 
(Geneva: UNCTAD, 1971). . 
4. British Petroleum Company Ltd's capital is 68 percent 
owned by the British state including a 20 percent . 
holding by the Bank of England. Royal.Dutch Shell 
is 39 percent owned by British nationals. On the 
basis of sales proceeds Shell is by far the largest 
industrial company outside the USA and is the second 
largest oil corporation after Exxon. BP is the sec-
ond largest non-American corporation and the biggest 
industrial concern in the UK. 'Of t~e ten largest 
British industrial corporations, Shell and BP'to-
gether account for half of all assets and three-
fifths of"all profits. British Petroleum, Annual. Report 
1975 (London: April 1976), p. 1, and Fortune (September 
15,'1967). 
5. Nigerian Petroleum Refining Company, The Nigerian' 
Refinery (Port Harcourt, n.d., 1966?), p. 7. 
6. Scott Pearson, Petrol.eum and the Nigerian Economy 
(Stanford University Press, 1970) p. 94. Pearson, 
who equates three dollars with one pound, reasons 
that the refinery, operating at 31,000 bd, could 
produce products replacing imports valued at £14 
million in 1967. The import content cost of refin-
ing was about £1.8 million while products. worth £0.8 
million were exported, giving foreign exchange bene-
fits of £13 million if it is assumed that crude used 
in refining would not otherwise have been exported. 
On currency equivalents the International. Labour 
Organization Yearbook for 1975 (Geneva: ILO, 1976) 
p. 815, states that one Nigerian pound was worth 
$2.80 until 1972 when it was worth.$1.52. The 
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naira was introduced in January 1973 and two 
naira equal one old Nigerian .pound. From March 
1973 one naira was worth $1 .• 52'- and from· the be-
ginning of 1974 a naira was worth. $1.62. From 
19 April 1974 the Nigerian currency has been float-
ing and.was considered in 1975 and 1976 to'be one 
naira to $1.6234 and $1.6103 :t:espectively. The 
Finanaial Times of,May IS, 1976 listed the. selling 
price of a naira at £1.166. 
7. Michael Tanzer, The Politiaal Eaonomy of International 
Oil and the Underdeveloped Countries (London: Temple, 
1969), p. 136. 
S. Barry Herman, 'Multinational Oligopoly in Poor Coun-
tries: how East Africa got its petroleum refineries' 
(University of ~lichigan, Ann Arbor: Center for Re-
search on Economic Development, Discussion Paper 39, 
September 1974) pp. 9-10. 
9. The majors, in order by size of sales are Exxon, 
Shell, Mobil" Texaco, Gulf, Socal and BP. 
10. Petroleum Press Serviae (August 1965). By 1965 new-
comers and state oil companies with international 
operations owned about two-fifths of refining capa-
city, while state oil entities in their horne coun-
tries owned ·the remaining one-fifth. 
11. Ibid. March 1963. 
12. NPRC, The Nigerian Refinery. 
13. BP Trading, Memorandum to BP-Shell (London: typed, 
1962) 
14. In 1959 the Hydrocarbon Section (Mines Division) of 
the Federal Ministry of Mines and Power was created 
and. headed by 'an expatriate'. The Petroleum Division, 
established in 1962,· was. headed bya· Nig.erian i,n 
1963 well after the refiner.y project was underway. 
15. A Nigerian petroleum technologist reported that 
while on attachment toBP in the UK during the 
early 1960s his request to see the refinery plans 
was refused by company officials. On 25 March 1964 
a Member of Parliament, Mr. -Odulana, criticised 
the refinery design for excluding a catalytic 
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cracker: ' The refinery ••• is half baked ••• grossly 
uneconomic ••• Nigeria will now have, to continue to 
:i,mport ••• high quality grade oi,1.... It is there-
fore crystal clear that the present refinery when 
completed will not be meeting the needs of our 
developing nation as envisaged by the promoters ••• 
this is a,means of holding our nation to ransom at 
the advantage of other foreign oil companies •••• ' 
Debates of the House of Representatives, 25 March 
1964 (Government Printer: Lagos). 
16. Interview information from ex-'refinery administra-
tor, Lagos, 1975. On the question of location the 
pamphlet celebrating the refinery's opening states 
that 'Six alternative sites were eventually selec-
ted for intensive study, three of them in the. Lagos 
area, the remainder around Port Harcourt, these 
being the two principal ports aiong the Nigerian 
coast. The team were looking ~or about 300 acres 
of land, .firm enough to support the heavy and ex-
pensive plant to be erected upon it, close to an 
existing road and railway network, within easy' 
reach of deep \oTater and the open ·sea, and not too 
far removed from the sources of crude oil. After 
due consideration of these matters, 'and in partic-
ular. of the cost of sea and inland transportation 
of products, it was finally decided that~the site 
most nearly meeting all requirements was near Alesa-
,Eleme.' The Nigerian Refinery, p. 7. 
17. Petro~eum Press Service (March 1963). 
18. British Petroleum news release (October 1965),. 
19. Interview with Nigerian employee of BP during the 
mid-1960s, Lagos, 1975. A London-based market sur-
vey team was employed by BP but there was no govern-
ment input and the report was a gross miscalculation. 
The Nigerian Refinery, ,p. 13,. also refers to 'recent 
market estimates' which indicate a throughput of 
1.6 m tons in 1967 to meet 'the full Nigerian'de-
ma~d for motor spirit and fuel oil •••• ' 
20. Nigeria's government borrowed,heavily from the World 
Bank to build ,im electricity-generating dam despite 
the fact that natural gas was being flared. Refin-
ery planning without reference to the dam project 
is astonishing given that they were under consider-
ation at the same time and involved huge expenditure. 
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21.' The Nigerian Refinery, p. 5 states that lEarly in 
1963, t:hr~e. Jllqin contractors were .,appointed, each 
one being made responsible for a major phase of the 
projected development •.• /earlier7 BP Trading Limi-
ted, who were appointed Techn'icaI Advisors to the 
Refinery, called for tenders from international re-
finery builders;' 
22. British Petroleum news release, 'Achievement' 
(London, 5 April 1963). ' 
23. FinanaiaZ Times (27 January 1966) . 
24. Petroleum haulage was largely controlled by Ibo 
lorry drivers and railway operators ""ho were unable 
and unwilling to transport products to the North 
after the massacres began. 
25. The negotiations resulted in a decree issued in Jan-
uary 1967, retroactive'to Jam~ary·19GQ, '",hichamend-
ed the Petroleum T.ax Adt to prov'idefor the esta~h­
ment of posted prices, payment of roya~ties ,and tax 
on those prices'and the.expensing of royalj:ies. 
26. Interview information, Lagos, 1975. In rebuilding 
the plant after federal troops gained control of 
Port Harcourt in 1968 it was necessary to award 
several contracts. During this process, Nige'rian 
members of the Refinery Board were interested in 
learning how original construction was arranged, 
and called on BP for the records. On'the basis of 
this investigation, 'it is reported that the origi-
nal contracts included some eiementsof price in~ 
flation. In, addition, Nigerians who took the jo~s 
of expatriates who were evacuated as the civil war 
broke out had access to company records for the 
first time. It was one officer's judgement that 
the costs of construction and management services 
were high. 
27. The Operating Agreement (Lagos: 1962), mimeo. 
28. Ibidem. 
29. Overpricing refers to increases in prices over the 
average price obtained in competitive world markets 
for the same or similar goods and which are paid by 
the buyer of technology who is compelled, in most 
- 35 -
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technology transfer. 
30. The 1962 Agreement specified exemptions for all 
materials, equipment, plant and machinery imported 
for operations, maintenance, alteration or exten-
sion of the refinery. Also exempt were refinery 
feedstocks, blending components', catalysts, addi-
tives and other chemicals. 
31. Interview, information (Lagos, 1975). 
32: Scott Pearson, Petpoleum and the Nigepian Eaonomy. 
gives an assessment of oil-related linkages. 
33. The processing' fee, charged per ton,of crude pro-
cessed, covers operating costs and a 15% rate of 
return on investment calculated on the 'basis of a 
discontinued cash flow. The fee is' 80 us cents a 
barrel or about $6.00 a ton. 
34. The seven marketing subsidiaries of international 
oil majors were keen to maintain their Nigerian 
markets and had made major investments during the 
1960s. A. ,Me1amid, 'The Geography of the Nigerian 
Petroleum Industry', Eaonomia Geography, Vol. 44 
(January 1968), p. 40. 
35. The expectations of BP and the Nigerian government 
were different. A BP spokesman stated in 1966 
that 'Ultimately nearly 90% of the staff will be 
Nigerian out of 200 employed'. In contrast the 
government expected 100% Nigerianization ultimate-
ly and wanted timetables for expatriate replace-
mentspe11ed O.ut; The Nigep.ian Refinepy (Lagos: 
Lagos Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 1966)', 
Vol. 8., 
,36. Federal Ministry of Mines and Power, Petroleum Di-
'vision, Annual Repopt 1970-71 (Lagos: Ministry of 
Information), 1972. 
37. Nigerian'Petroleum Refining Co. Ltd, Annual Repopt 
and Statement of Aaaounts 1973 (Lagos: April 1974) 
p. 3. This decision may have been reversed in 
light of the Third National'Deve10pment Plan 
(1975-80) announcement that the Port Harcourt re-
finery was to be extended from 60,000 to 75,000 bd 
.:.. .. :.; 
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capacity and that the policy of Nigerianization in 
general was to be relaxed.--In-August· ·1-975-BP em-
ployees seconded from London were working in the 
refinery. 
38, The Refinery Agreement (19721 and The Ret';lnery O!'~ 
erating Agreement (1972) (Lagos; 19721 mimeo. A 
prominent supporter and advocate of the refo~ms 
was A.A. Atta, Permanent Secretary of theMinist~y 
'of Finance to 1971 when he became Secretary to the 
Federal Military Government. A year before his 
death Atta noted that among 'the'·'ou:!:.s·tanding 
achievements of the military rule Lwas7 a radical 
approach to petroleum affairs ••• ' .'Tne development 
of Nigeria's Political Personality', QuaptepZy 
JoupnaZ of Administpation (October 19]1). 
39. The price at which marketers buy'brude from Shell-
BP remained at this 1962 level to 197& but the in-
creases in royalty and petroleum profits tax of 
1974 and 1975 were not passed on to crude destined 
for the refinery. 
40. In May 1968 federal troops took control of Port 
Harcourt and found that the refinery installations 
had suffered considerable damage ari·sing from both 
military action and disuse. The petroleum Division 
reported that 'It is believed that the refinery was 
in operation for most of 1967 but the record of its 
operations during the time it was in the hands of 
the rebels are not yet available.' AnnuaZ Repopt 
1967-68 (Lagos: Ministry of Information 1970), 
p. 14. 
41. Data on NPRC staff in 1967 is not available but it 
is unlikely that its ethnic composition differed 
from that of the Nigerian staff of Shell-BP Petro~ 
leum Development Co. Ltd in Port Harcourt. Ninety 
percent of Shell-BP's Nigerian staff were,Ibo·and . 
from the Eastern Region. . 
42. The Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree (1972) 
requires that Nigerians own 100% of the equity in 
simple businesses and 40% of a group of more com-
plex undertakings. The Se.cond National Development 
Plan document includes a discussion of this new po-
licy. PZan 1970-74 (Lagos: Federal Ministry of In-
formation, 1970), p. 144 • 
i 
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43. Ibidem pp. 144-45. 
44. Petroleum Economi8t (September 1974), p. 344. 
45. The Petroleum Economi8t of September 1974 reported 
' ••• strong building activity in North ~~erica and 
a succession of proposals for large-scale export 
refineries in the Middle East'. The US Federal 
Energy Administration has forcast 4 mbd additional 
capacity in. the US by the end of 1977. In 1974 
Nigeria was considering three or four large export 
refineries of some 200.,000 bd each. 
Excluding the Communist bloc, a total of 264 
refinery projects (new plants and expansions) are 
planned with a total capacity of 1,496 m metric 
tons a year or 29.96 mbd. Given that world capacity 
in 1973 was 2,643 m metric tons a year this is an 
immense projected increase which will swell refin~ 
ery capacity by more than half. In contrast, the 
last three years show a rate of capacity increase 
of 8% per annum. The appendix includes a table 
showing existing refining capacity and the propor-
tion of total planned expansion by region. Petro-
leum Economi8t {September 1974). 
46. Central Bank of Nigeria figures show that for 1973 
the total value of Nigerian exports was _ 
Nl,695,600,000 of which Nl,376,000,000 or 61.2% 
was contributed by crude oil exports. See Table 2 
in the appendix. 
47. For instance Sir Frank McFadzean, Chairman of 
Shell, introduced the -1975 Annual Report by ob~ 
serving-that Shell companies ' ••• have improved 
. their position as international buyers and traders 
in oil and despite the changes in ownership Lof 
exploration and production subsidiaries7 a very 
considerable degree of flexibility and-reliability 
in quality and sources of supply has been restored. 
IShell companies7 are also developing new lines 
of business in the provision of technical advice 
and support, in some cases linked- to oil supply 
arrangements.' Financial Time8, 14th May 1976. 
48_. State marketing results from the acquisition in 
1975 of 60% of the equity in Shell :/>Iarketing 
Nigeria. Given that state marketing outlets will 
be supplied with products from the--state-owned re-
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finery, they may receive favourable treatment which 
in turn can be translated into an expanded share ~·of 
the market. From this perspective, Shell,' s market-
ing partnership with the government makes business 
sense. 
49. In 1974 the cost of production was from 35 to 40 
US cents per barrel. By 1976 the producing sub-
sidiaries were reporting· costs of 75 to 150 US 
cents a barrel. The new refinery will likely ac-
quire crude at tax-paid cost (production and other 
taxes due government) but in effect one state 
agency is paying tax to another agency. Rather 
than the consumer paying for these taxes as part 
of his price of purchase, it is likely that the 
state will bear them through transferring other oil 
income. 
50. Press Release (Lagos: Federal Ministry of Informa-
tion, 27 November 1971). 
51. The Refinery Agreement (1972) (Lagos: 1972), mimeo. 
52. British Petroleum Company Ltd and Shell Petroleum 
N.V, Nigeria: Additional Refinery Capaaity, 1971 
(Lagos: 1971), mimeo. The proposed refinery was to 
be commissioned on 1 January 1974. 
53. In October 1973 the state introduced fixed prices 
at the lowest level at which oil products were be-
ing sold and decreed that these prices should pre-
vail throughout the Federation. This reduced pro-
duct costs in the northern states and undoubtedly 
increased consumption. Products affected are motor 
spirit (regular and premium), kerosene, automotive 
gas Oil, low power fuel oil and liquid petroleum 
gas. The Federal Government bore the cost which 
amounted to a loss ·of about $25m in excise duties, 
the amount gained in 1972, and $10m which was paid 
to the states to compensate them for revenue lost 
through the abolition of Purchase Tax. These tax 
sacrifices were made possible by the increase in 
state revenues from the Petroleum Profits Tax on 
crude production. 
54. Data from interviews (Lagos and. London, 1974 and 
1975). Decisions on the refinery's product lines 
determine what process units are needed. Where 
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the difference between one process and another is 
not great, parent companies tend to promote their 
license successfully. For i'nstance, the Port 
Harcourt refinery was built by Procon which used 
the parent company Universal Oil Products' process 
in the catalytic reformer (platforming). It is not 
known how BP. chose that process but optimization 
studies done by IFP andBEICIP favoured the.IFP re-
forming process which was chosen for the second re-
finery. 
55. .Times (London, 28 October 1975). The story reports 
that originally 40 companies from different coun-
tries bid for the tender. In contrast a member of 
the project team reported in late 1974 that 3 of 
20 pre-qualification submissions culminated in 
bids. . 
56. PetroZeum InteZZigenae WeekZy (5 April 1976), p. 12:. 
The report refers to 'the turnkey contract'. 
57. The price was fixed in October 1973 at 8.8 kobo per 
litre for regular gasoline and 9.5 kobo per litre· . 
for premium. Premium gas in Nigeria is 93 octane 
which In some countries is the octane number of the 
·regular grade. Proponents of the catalytic cracker 
hope to see 101 octane premium gas on sale in the 
future. 
58. Interview information, British Petroleum Co. Ltd 
(London 1974). 
59. Interview information (Lago~,.1975). 
60. Thanks is due to John Peel who defines revenue pro-
digality or permissiveness as a spendthrift spirit 
occasioned by abundant oil revenue. 
61. New Nigerian (13 October 1975); ' .•. the Kaduna re-
finery, without a cracking unit, will produce a lot 
of heavy products such as gas oil and bunker fuel. 
As there are not enough industries in the northern 
states to consume these heavy gases, it means that 
they will. have to be exported'. 
62. After the July 1975 coup which overthrew Gowon the 
new government under Muratala Muhammed established 
the Uputa Commission to investigate petrol short-
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National Oil Corporation (April 1975). In the 
1974-75 Budget Speech,_ General Gowon stated that 
' ••• oil is not the only commodity whose price has 
gone up in the past year or two. Prices of prac-
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stable and unchanged'. A Better Life for the 
People, 1974-74 Federal Budget (1 April 1974). 
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APPENDIX 1 
Nigeria: Annual Values a/Total Imports and Exports and Crude Oil Exports 1958-1975 
Year Value Total Exports 
Imports Value Crude Oil Percen tage Increase Over Trade Balance 
Last Year 
N Million Vaiue Total N Million Percent Total Total Export Crude Oil N Million 
N Million Export. Export 
1958 333.8 271.4 1.8 0.7 -62.4 
1959 358.8 271.6 5.2 1.9 0,07 188.89 -81.2 
1960 430.4 329.8 8.4 2.5 21.43 61.54 -100.6 
1961 444.8 347.0 22.6 6.5 5.22 169.05 -97.8 
1962 406.0 . 337.2 34.4 10.2 2.82 52.21 -68.8 
1963 415.0 379.2 40.4 10.7 12.46 17.44 -35.8 
1964 508.6 429.2 64.2 15.0 13.19 58.91 -79.4 
1965 550.6 536.8 176.2· 25.4 25.07 112.15 -In 
1966 512.8 568.2 184.0· 32.4 5.84 35.10 -35.4 
1967 447.2 . 483.6 144.2 29.8 -14.89 -21.63 . 37.0 
1968 385.2 422.2 77.6 18.4 12.70 46.19 37.0 
1969 497.4 636.2 301.4 47.4 50.69 288.40 138.8 
1970 756.4 . 885.4 .509.8 57.6 39.17 . 2.79 129.0 
1971 1076.4 1297.4 951.8 73.4 46.53 86.70 221.0 
1972 980.6 1405.2 1152.6 82.0 8.31 21.10 424.6 
1973 1194.8 1695.6 1376.0 81.2 20,67 19.38 500.8 
1974 1666.0 6106.0 5671.0 93.0 260.00 312.14 4440.0 
1975 3700.0 5050.0 4700.0 93.0 -17.30 -17.12 1350.0 
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria 
APPENDIX 2 
Comparison of Government Revenue 
Per Barrel of Crude Oil. Exported 
(TIS cents) 
Saudi-
Year Kuwait Arabia Iran Iraq Libya Venezuela Nigeria 
1958 ·81.7 81.7 89.0 88.9 n.a. 111.6 10.0 
1959 17.8 75.8 83.6 82.4 n.a. 98.4 65.6 
1960 76.4 75.0 80.1 78.6 n.a. 89.2 57.5 
1961 74.4 75.5 75.8 76.6 62.7 92.9 51.6 
1962 74.8 76.5 74.5 76.5 64.7 97.2 49.7 
1963 74.3 78.7 79.7 80.7 65.0 98.6 54.1 
1964- 76.9 82.0 81.8 80.1 62.9 95.4 48.3 
1965 78.9. 82.2 82.9 81.7 83.8 95.0 38~3 
1966 78.4 83.4 83.2 81. 3 87.0 91.2 29.5 
1967 78.5 84.2 83.5 85.4 99.1 98.3 42.8 
Average 17 .2 '79.5 81.4 81.2 75.1 96.8 44.7 
Source: Petro Zeum :Inte ZZige.nce Week ly (16th September 1968) 
APPENDIX 3 
FederaZ Government OiZ Revenue 
(H' miZZionl 
YEAR AMOUNT 
1958 n.a. 
1959 0.6 
1960 2.6 
1961 14.2 
1.962 17.0 
1963 10.0 
1964 24.4 
1965 26.8 
1966 37.4 
1967 54.2 
1968 33.4 
1969 . 53.8 
1970 176.2 
1971 542.4 
1972 747.6 
1973 985.6 
1974/5 2,635~9 
1976 5,010.5 
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria 
COlllpany % 
I .• 4GIP 22.5 
Phillips 22.5 
NNOC 55.0 
.. Ish/allcl' 100.0 
3. Demillex 44.0 
NNOC 51.0 
Niger Pet. Co 5.0 
4 .. Elf 45.0 
NNOC 55.0 
5. Gulf 45.0 
NNOC 55.0 
6. Japan Pet. 49.0 
NNOC 51.0 
7. Japan Pet. 40.0 
NNOC 51.0 
Niger Oil Res. 9.0 
8. Mobil 45 
NNOC 55 
9. Mobil 50 
Tenneco 37.5 
Sun OX 12.5 
APPENDIX 4 
Oil Companies Engaged in Exploration and Production: Nigeria 1975 
Area (sq ml) Subsidiary and Parent Company 
Present 
• Nigerian Agip Oil Co Ltd. subsidiary of the Italian state company ENI 
- Phillips Oil Company (Nigeria) Ltd, Nigerian subsidiary of Phillips Petroleum Co of Oklahoma 
2,031 - Nigerian National Oil Corporation, Nigerian State Oil Company 
432 - Ashland Oil Nigeria Co, subsidiary of Ashland Oil Co of the US 
Note: Production sharing contract, Ashland will explore at its risk until production is established, at which time, Ashland 
will start to recover exploration costs from a portion of the production while NNOC and Ashland will split the rest at 65-
35% for output up to 50,000 bd and 70-30% if production exceeds 50,000' 
- A Nigerian subsidiary of the German oil consortium. Deutsche Schachtbau (gov'l) has 10% , Gelsenberg (gov't) has 18.5% 
Preussag (gov't) has 7% , Saarbergwerke (gov't controlled) has 9% , Viba Chemie, Wintershall (gov't) and Union Rheinische 
(private) with 18.5% each 
900 • Niger Petroleum Corporation, Nigerian Independent 
- Enterprise de recherches et d'activites petrolieres, French State oil corporation and "owning 40% in Elf Nigeria. Sogerap, So-
1.178 ciete de gestion et de participation de Elf Erap owns 10% and Safex, Societe Africaine d'exploitation petr0lieres, owns 50% 
5.002 
536 
- Gulf Oil Company (Nigeria) Ltd, subsidiary of Gulf Oil Co. 
- Japan Petroleum Co (Nigeria) Ltd, wholly owned subsidiary of Nigeria Oil Company which is formed of Japan Pet. Dev., 
Teijin, Mitsui and 16 other Japanese Industrial firms 
616 • Niger Oil Resources, Nigerian Independent 
- Mobil Producing Nigeria, subsidiary of Mobil Oil Corporation 
1,024 
- Tenneco Oii Co of Nigeria, subsidiary of Tenneco Inc of Houston 
872 - Sun OX Nigeria, wholly owned subsidiary of Sun Oil Co of Philadelphia 
10. Occidental 49 
NNOC 51 290 
- Occidental Petroleum (Nigeria), subsidiary of the Occidental Petrol~um Corp of Los Angeles 
II. Pan Ocean 100 
Delta 388 
- Pan Ocean Oil Co (Nigeria), subsidiary of Pan Ocean Oil Corp of New York 
- Delta Oil (Nigeria) Ltd; Nigerian company controlled by Mr. Amachree of Lagos. Owner of the OPL 71 which was farmed 
out to Pan Ocean. Overriding royalty interest of 3.7% in Pan Ocean 
12. Phillips 100 175 
13. ·Shell 22.5 
BP 22.5 
- Wholly owned subsidiary of Royal Dutch Shell and forming with BP Shell/BP Petroleum Development Co of Nigeria Ltd 
NNOC 55.0 16,931 - British Petroleum Oil Co forming with Shell the Nigerian company named above 
14. H. Stephens 49 
NNOC 51 30 
- H. Stephens and Sons Ltd, a Nigerian private enterprise 
IS. Texaco 50 
Chevron 50 43 
- Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co (Nigeria) Ltd, subsidiary of Texaco of New York 
- Chevron Oil Company (Nigeria) Ltd subsidiary of the Standard Oil Company of California 
• Ashland is actually under contract to NNOC whose concession it is. 
Operator in italics. 
Source: Petroconsultants SA, Nigeria: Annual Review 1974 (Geneva: March 1975) 
Country 
1965 
USA 387.6 
Venezuela 182.2 
Iran 95.0 
Libya 58.9 
Saudi Arabia 100.6 
Kuwait 109.1 
Iraq 64.4 
Nigeria 13.5 
Algeria 26.6 
APPENDIX 5 
Cntde Oil Production in Selected Countries 
Production in million tonnes .. 
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 
411.9 437.5 452.9 458.7 478.6 
177.0 186.1 189.9 188.7 195.2 
105.2 129.6 141.8 168.1 191.3 
72.4 84.1 125.7 149.9 159.8 
118.8 129.0 140.9 148.6 176.2 
114.4 115.2 122.1 129.5 137.5 
68.1 60.2 73.9 74.9 76;9 
20.4. 15.6 7.2 26.4 52.9 
34.2 39.1 42.9 44.5 48.5 
Source: BP Statistical Review 01 the World Oil Industry, (1975) 
Yearly change in % 
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1975/ 1975/ 1975/ 
1965 1970 1974 
469.9 470.1. 457.3 436.8 415.2 + 0.7 - 2.8 - 4.9 
187.7 171.5 179.0 158.5 124.7 - 3.7 - 8.6 -2L3 
.227.0 251.9 293.2 301.4 267.9 + 10.9 + 7.0 - ILl 
133.1 108.2 104.9 73.5 71.9 + 2.0 - 14.8 - 2.2 
223.4 285.4 364.7 412.4 343.9 + 13.1 + 14.3 - 16.6 
147.1 151.2 138.4 114.4 92.4 - 1.6 - 7.6 +19.2 
83.5 72.1 99.0 96.9 109.3 + 5.4 + 7.3 +12.8 
74:7 88.9 100.1 112.2 88.8 + 20.7 + 10.9 - 20.9 
36.5 50.1 51.2 48.5 45.0 + 5.4 - 1.5 - 7.2 
APPENDIX 6 
Sub-Saharan Africa: !t 
Crude Oil Exports 1972 
(thousahds of barrels daily) 
1972 . 1973 1974 
AngoZa to - North America 61 99 96 
South America 21 4 
Western Europe 22 16 43 
Far East 31 26 11 
Total 135 145 150 
Gabon to - North America 24 16 45 
South America 25 30 39 
Western Europe 52 68 94 
Other Africa 4 5 2 
Far East 1 
Total 105 119 181 
Nigeria to - North America 457 568 683 
South America 115 278 240 
Western Europe 1080 1003 1130 
Other Africa 26 30 34 
Far East 78 99 95 
Total 1756 1978 2182 
Source: Angola-Shell estimates, 
Bulletin (19'14) 
2 Excluding Southern Africa 
Gabon and Nigeria, OPEC AnnuaZ Statistical 
Angola 
Congo (People's 
Republic of) 
Gabon 
Malagasy Republic 
Mozambique 
Nigeria 
Tanzania 
Zaire 
Zambia 
Proved 
Reserves 
(million 
barrels) 
1,410 
950 
650 
19,600 
...;. 
APPENDIX 7 
Sub-Saharan Afl'ica:~ 
Energy Resources, 1974 
(Fossil- Fuel-s) 
Production 
(million 
barrels) 
63 
17 
80 
820 
Proved 
Reserves 
(billion 
m3 ) 
50 
180 
50 
1,420 
Production 
(billion 
m3 ) 
2 
Negligible 
Negligible 
21 
Reserves 
(million 
tons) 
40 
80 
250 
180 
720 
50 
Sources: Crude Oil a~d Natural Gas _. Wo~l-dOiZ· 
Coal - World Energy Conference '1974 
(IS August 1975) ~ 
2 Excluding Southern Africa 
Produc-
tion 
(milli·on 
tons) 
0.4 
0.6 
Neglig-:-
ible 
0.1 
0.9 
APPENDIX 8 
sub-Sciharan Afriaa: :Jj 
Energy Coneumption 1974 
'(CommerciaZ' Primary Energy) 
(thousands of barrels dail.y oil. equivaZent) 
,Country Oil Coal Natural Gas Hydro-Elec~ricity Total 
Angola 27 5 32 
Ghana 16 23 '39 ' 
Ivory Coast 22 2 24 
Kenya 38 1 4 43 
Mozambique 14 7 2 23 
,Nigeria 59 8 4 12 83 
Senegal 28 28 
Zaire 21 6 1 24 52 
Zambia, 17 13 23 53 
Note: Oil demand comprises refined product consumption and refinery use/loss 
hydro-electricity is expressed in 'terms of input equivalent. 
Source: Shell estimates 
~ Excluding South,Africa 
APPENDIX 9 
Africa: Oil-Product Consumption in Selected Countries 1974 
(thousands of barrels daily) 
Motor Kerosine Gas Oil/ FuelOil Aviation Ocean Other Total 
Gasoline Diesel Fuels Bunkers Products Refined Oil 
Fuel Products 
Angola 3 1 8 2 5 5 25 
Cameroon/Central African 
Republic/Chad/Congo/Gabon 4 2 8 1 2 2 1 20 
Equatorial Guinea 1 1 
Ethiopia 2 4 2 1 1 10 
French Territory of Afars & Isas " 1 2 4 7 
The Gambia 1 1 
Ghana 5 2 4 1 15 
Guinea 1 1 1 2 5 
Guinea-Bissau 1 1 
Kenya 5 6 H 6 7 2 35 
Liberia 1 3 4 I 9 
Malagasy Republic 3 1 3 1 2 12 
Malawi I I 1 3 
Mozambique 1 1 6 I 1 2 1 13 
Nigeria 20 6 14 7 3 4 55 
Senegal/Dahomey /Ivory Coast/Mali/ 
Mauritania/Niger/Togo/Uppct Volta 10 3 14 12 3 15 2 59 
Sierra Leone 1 1 I I 2 6 
Somalia 1 1 2 
Sudan 2 1 7 3 1 1 16 
Tanzania 3 2 6 3 1 1 16 
Uganda 2 1 :2 1 1 7 
Zaire/Rwanda/Burundi 4 2 6 2 2 2 1 19 
Zambia 4 8 3" 1 1 17 
Source: Shell estimates 
APPENDIX 10 
Refinery Capacity: Sub-Sahar~nAfrica. excluding Southern Africa. 1975 
Thousands of Barrels per Day 
Key to Locations 
(Capacity in brackets) 
A: Angola - Cabinda (3) 
B : Angola - Luanda (33) 
C: Ethiopia - Assab (14) 
D: Gabon - Port Gentil (17) 
E: Ghana - Tema (28) 
F : Ivory Coast - Abidjan (43) 
G: Kenya - Mombasa (48) 
H: Liberia - Monrovia (II) 
I : Malagasy - Tamatave (15) 
J : Mozambique - 1. Marques (17) 
K: Nigeria - Port Harcourt (60) 
L: Senegal - Dakar (15) 
M: Sierra Leone - Freetown (10) 
N: Sudan - Port Sudan (22) 
0: Tanzania - Dar es Salaam (16) 
P : Zaire - Muanda (16) 
Q: Zambia - Ndola (25) 
Source: Oil & Gas Journal (30/12/74) 

APPENDIX'll 
~efinepie8 in Afpiaa 1976 
KEY 
o = Distillation 
H = Hydrocracklng 
Vis = Vlsbreaklng 
C = Cracking } I C {= Catalytic R = Reforming c asslfled aST = Thermal 
B = Bitumen 
L = Lubricating oils 
( ) = Completion date 
n.B. = Not available 
Compan, and add, ••• R.nnary 
location ~:J:~ Distillation I . I leurr.ftC: crude clpaclt, , Crackln. R.Io,mlna .h~ourhput 
ALGERIA 
Sonttt'lch. Chemin db RellNolr. Hydra. AI,.r a 
Sonltrach.Rlffineril D'AI,ar, P.O. Box 71, EI Harrach, Alilor. 
ANGOLA 
Companhia d. Petroleo. d. Ancell, Cab,. POlta11230, Luanda 
CGmpanhla de P~tr6leoJ de Miola 
ETHIOPIA 
Ethiopian Petroleum Share Company, Addis Ababa 
GABON 
Soc. Equatorial. d. Ram".,_. P.O. BolIC 530, Pore Gantll 
GHANA 
GhanaJln Italian Petroleum Co. (GHAIP) Ltd., Accra 
IVORY COAST 
Soc. I.olrlonn. d. RaHlnq •• B.P. 1269. Abidjan 
KENYA 
Eut A'riean 011 Rafinlri .. Ltd .• P.O. 80. 90401. Homb ... 
LIBERIA 
Liberiln Refinin, Co., Indunrla' Park, Monrovia 
Ljbcrf.~n R"t{inint Co. 
LIBYA 
ESIO 5irta tn, .. TripclJ 
t·:;," Gove,,,mrnt 
Lib,,,,., Ciowe',nm.nt 
MALAGASY 
Socl ••• HII,aehi d. RaHln',I. P.O. Box 433. Tam ..... 
HwlHweoud 
EI Hunch 
D 
D/R 
Luanda. 
Luanda 
" .. ab 
Pa" Gon,lI 
TomB 
Abldlan 
Homblll 
Monroylll 
Monrovia' 
PROPOSED D/R/B 
R 
DIB 
D/R/B 
D/R/VI. 
D/R 
D/R 
D/R/B 
PROPoseD D/R/B 
DIR/B 
POrt 8N"~~R COrilSTRUc?,W)N 
Zov/a 0 
PROPOSED 
Tob,uk 0 
Tamatavo D/R 
In barr.l. par calendar da, C·.t ... am day) 
4100 
60000 
35000 
13000· 
22000· 
14790' 
17000 
28000' 
37000 
86000 
ISOClO 
9000' 
60'000 
13000.:/ 
15000 
7000 Vii 
UOOoC 
2000C 
J()DOOC 
3000'" 
2 ()DOOC 
2000 C 
45OO0 C 
·5150 C 
9000 C 
2000 C 
3000 
2000 C 
1000 
n ... 
n.a. 
35000 
(19161 
(19191 
14790' 
n.l. 
259000 
26000 
n ••• 
10500 
(1915) 
9800" 
(n.a.) 
(n.a.J 
n.l. 
MOROCCO 
Soc. Ch~r"ifienn. des Perrole •• 27 Chari;. MauillY Harran. Rabat Sidi .. Kacem D!C/R 28000 4600 C 2900 C 20000 (Now su.te..owncd) 
SA Marcoeaine .. ltalienne de Raffinqe (SAMIR), Mohammedia Mohammedia D/R 50 000· 6SOO'C 34000 
MOZAMBIQUE 
SONAREP (Soc. Nacional de RefinaCao de Petroleo.), eaixa Matala. D/R/8 16000' 2SOO'C 11000 
Poltill 1866. Lourenco Marques 
NIGERIA 
The Nicer-ian Petroleum Refinin, Co. Ltd., P.O. Box 2181. USCSI Pore Harcourt (Alese) D/R 60000 5700 C n.a. 
Port Harcourt 
RHODESIA 
Central Afrion Petroleum Refineries (Private) Ltd., P.O. Box Um .. 11 (Not Opemln,) D/C/R/B 20000 7000 C 3000 C n.a. 
391. Umtali 6000 T 
SENEGAL 
Soc. Afric::aine de Raffinale, P.O. 80x 203, 15 Bid. d. II Dakar D/R 
Republique. Dakar 
12000 2000 C n ... 
SIERRA LEONE 
Sierra leone Petroleum Rennin, Co. Ltd •• B.P. House. Cotton Tt;ae Freetown 0 10000 n ... 
SOUTH 'AFRICA 
Caltex Oil (SA.) Pey. Ltd., P.O. Box 13. Milner-ton. Cape Town Cape Town D/R/B/C/VI. 6S 000' 10000·Vil 11OOO·C 51000 
11OOO'C 
Mobil Refininc Com piny of South Africa (Pty.) Ltd •• Durban D/C/R/B 100000 14500 C 16000 C n.a. 
P.O. Box 956. Durban 
17000'C National Petroleum Refinars of South Africa (Pty.) Ltd., P.O. Box Sasolbur&: D/C/R/H 72000' 107OO'C 72000· 
234. Suolbur" O.F.S. 9900'H 
SATMAR ltd •• P.O. Box 5083. Bok.bur, North. Transvaal Boklburc DlctB 3900' 1ooo'T 
24000 
3100· 
Shell &: SP South African Petroleum Refineries (Pty.) Ltd •• Durban D/R/B/L/C 200000 20000 C n.a. 
P.O. Box 3179, Durban. Natal 
UNDER CONSTRUCTION 
Colt .. Oil (5.1..) Ply. ltd. Cape Tewn , 50000, 3000" It9nJ Cope Town OIC 12300'C (1978) 
SUDAN 
Shell and BP (Sudan) ltd .• P.O. Box 354. Port Sudan Port Sudan D/R 24000 2000 C n.a. 
TANZANIA 
Tanzanian and tuUan Petroleum Ref'lnina Co. (TIPER) ltd •• 
P.O. Box 1608. Dar .... -S.I .. m 
Dar*G,·S.lum D/R 17000' 3OOO'C 15500· 
TOGD 
UNDER CONSTRUCTION· 
F/ond A,' & Minera' Carpn. (for To,o Geyernmtnd lDme D/RIH 20000· . 
TUNISIA 
SOC. Tunilo-luUenne d. Ramn ... , II Ava. d. Paris, Tunis Sllerta 'O/R 25000' 3OOO·C 240000 (NoVi nate<1)Wned) 
ZAIRE (CONGO·KINSHASA) 
Soc. Zairo--Itallonne d. Rafflnq. (SOZIR), Coin Avenu •• , Klnlao-Molnda D/R 17000' 3 SOO·C 1] 000· 
T omba.Baye at Ku.1 
PROPOSED 
SOZ/R Kln/oo-Moondo D/R +6500 (n.o.) 
ZAMBIA 
Indeni ltd. N'OoI. D/R/B 25000' 56OO'C 16500· 
Petroleum Times January 23, 1976 
APPENDIX 12 
Afpiaa: ppojeats fop Ne~ Refinepies in 1974 
country planned capacity 
'000 tons 
Libya' 
Tobruk {Govt)Z 
Zuetina (Govt)lt 
Tunisia 
.Gabes {Govt)Z 
Algepia 
Skikda {Sonatrach)lt 
Maupitania 
Nouadhibou {Govt)lt 
Togo 
Lome {Govt)lt 
Nigepia 
Kaduna, North Central 
(Govt)!ll: 
Warri, Midwest {Govt)lt 
Camepoon 
location uncertain {Govt)lt 
Congo (BX'azzaviZ"le) . 
Pointe-Noire (Sibetra) 
Angola 
Lobito (SP de Exploracia 
de petroleos) 
South AfX'iaa 
Richards Bay (Trek-
Beleggings) 
Reunion 
Somalia 
location uncertain 
{Govt/INOC)lt 
Sudan 
Port sudan (Triadnaft/ 
Govt)lt 
per year 
11 ,000 
20,000 
7,500 
15,000 
1,000 
1,250 
3,750 
5,000 
2,000 
1,000 
2,000 
6,000 
600 
500 
7,000 
Source: Petpoleum Eaonomist (September 1974) 
It Wholly or mainly state-owned 
probable 
completion 
1978 
1978 
nd 
1978 
1976 
1975 
1980 
1977 
nd 
nd 
1975 
1977 
1975 
nd 
nd 
APPENDIX 13 
Refinery E~pan8ion in Africa 1974 
('000 tons per year) 
country present planned 
total total 
Libya 
Zawie (Govt)!ot 3,000 6,000 
Morocco 
Mohammedia (Govt)!ot 2,200 5,700 
Tunisia 
Bizerts (STIR) 1,250 2,250 
Gabon 
Port Gentil (Elf-
Union et al) 1,000 2,000 
South Africa 
Capetown. (Caltex) 2,300 3,000 Durban (Mobil) 3,000 5,000 
Source: PetroZeum Economist (September 1974) 
!ot Wholly or mainly state-owned 
net 
addition 
3,000 
3,500 
1,000 
1,000 
700 
2,000 
probable 
completion 
1978 
1977 
1975 
nd 
1975 
1974 
APPENDIX 14 
Existing and PZanned Refining Capacity 
by Region (milZion tons) 
1915 % share of % share of % share of 
region capacity at total 1973 projected total 1975 
year's end capacity - expansion capacity 
in 1973 
North America 874 31.1 21.4 24.33 
Latin America 381 11.5 10.4 10.61 
Western Europe 1,042. 34.4 29.4 29.00 
Middle East 139 4.8 16.8 3.87 
Africa 62 2.0 5.8 1. 73 
South East Asia 144 16.2 16.2 4.01 
World 3,592 100.0 100.0 100.00, 
Source: BP StatistiaaZ Review of the World Oil Industry 1973 and 1975 
